


Valentina  
Izmirlieva

ALL THE  
NAMES  
OF  
THE  
LORD

Chicago



ALL THE NAMES OF  
THE LORD

*Lists, Mysticism, and Magic*

Valentina Izmirlieva





ALL THE NAMES OF THE LORD

Lists, Mysticism, and Magic

VALENTINA IZMIRLIEVA

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS  
CHICAGO AND LONDON

VALENTINA IZMIRLIEVA is associate professor in the Slavic Department at Columbia University.

This book is a volume in the series Studies of the Harriman Institute, Columbia University.

The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637  
The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London  
© 2008 by The University of Chicago  
All rights reserved. Published 2008  
Printed in the United States of America

17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 I 2 3 4 5

ISBN-13: 978-0-226-38870-0 (cloth)

ISBN-10: 0-226-38870-0 (cloth)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data  
Izmirlieva, Valentina.

All the names of the Lord : lists, mysticism, and magic / Valentina Izmirlieva.  
p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN-13: 978-0-226-38870-0 (cloth : alk. paper)

ISBN-10: 0-226-38870-0 (cloth : alk. paper) I. God (Christianity)—Name.

I. Title.

BT180.N2I96 2008

231—dc22

2007044616

⊗ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1992.



FOR TOM

*Silver and gold I have none,  
but what I have I give you.*  
—Acts 3:6

All language . . . rests on a single name, never in itself preferable [*sic*]:  
the name of God. Contained in all propositions, it necessarily remains  
unsaid in each.

—Giorgio Agamben, "The Idea of the Name"

All has become names by the Middle Ages, and earlier.

—Joshua Trachtenberg, *Jewish Magic and Superstition*

Lists *mix* God and grocer; they are divinely grocerly and grocerly divine,  
in variable proportions.

—Francis Spufford, *The Chatto Book of Cabbages and Kings*

Anyone who tries to get to the bottom of everything is sliding down a  
dangerous slope.

—Flaubert, *Bouvrard and Pécuchet*



C O N T E N T S

---

	Acknowledgments	ix
	Introduction	1
	Divine Names as Terms of Order	2
	What Kind of Order?	4
	Lists as Figures of Display	6
	What Is Symbolic Production of Order?	7
	The Material	9
	<i>Part One: The Claim of Theology: "Nameless and of Every Name"</i>	
1.	<i>The Divine Names</i> and Dionysius the Areopagite	17
	Myth and Mystification	17
	The Exegetes	19
	The Translators	20
	Disputed Authorship and Indisputable Authority	22
2.	Back to the Sources	26
	The Bible and the Name	27
	The Trouble with Logos	30
	The Two Roads, or the Nature of Divine Names	32
3.	The Synthesis of Dionysius	37
	The Dionysian Vision	37
	The Theological Project	40
	United Differentiations	43
	A Hierarchy of Names	46
	Nameless and of Every Name	49

4.	Theory and Practice	51
	Biblical Exegesis	51
	The Proper Name of God Is a List	53
	Listing the Names of God	56
	<i>Part Two: A Magical Alternative: The 72 Names of God</i>	
5.	How Many Are the Names of God?	69
	The Number of God's Names	70
	The Larger Context	74
	The Synonymy of 72 and 70	77
6.	A Body of 72 Parts and the 72 Diseases	79
7.	An Apostle for Every Nation	84
	The Division of the Languages at Babel	85
	The Septuagint	88
	The 72 Disciples of Christ	89
	The Ideal Quorum	92
8.	The Peculiar Codex <i>Jerusalem 22</i>	97
	The Facts	98
	A Kabbalistic Hypothesis	99
	The Balkan Context	100
	Three Possible Kabbalistic Indices	104
	The Emphasis on 72	109
	Kabbalah and the World of 72 Parts	112
9.	Christian Culture and the 72 Names	117
	Kabbalah in Christian Garb	117
	The Christian Amulet East and West	123
10.	Printing and the Career of the Slavonic Text	132
	The <i>Miscellany for Travelers</i> and the Remaking of the Text	133
	The Spectacular Aftermath	135
	Building Textual Affinities	138
	Commercial Success	140
	The <i>Abagar</i> of Philip Stanislavov	145
	Epilogue	151
	Two Visions of Order	152
	Religion, Need, and Desire: A Reorientation	154
	The Danger of Closures	158



## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

---

---

This book, like a baby monster, was in gestation for fifteen long years, during which it accumulated many debts. Some of the people who helped me nurse it to life are no longer here to accept my acknowledgments; others are probably so tired of the book that they would *not* want to hear any more about it. I should know better than to list all their names in a book that regards comprehensive lists as precariously ambitious. Conforming to the rules of the game, I will mention only some. All of them—the nameless with the named—have my deepest gratitude.

Several people were instrumental in the conception of this project: my first teacher of things medieval, Krassimir Stantchev (Rome), who introduced me to Dionysius the Areopagite; Klimentina Ivanova (Sofia), who taught me the joy of working with Slavonic manuscripts and much more; the late Klaus-Dieter Seemann (Berlin), who, by inviting me to participate in a conference on the “neglected” medieval genres, inadvertently pointed me in the direction of names and lists; and David Tracy (Chicago), who gave me not only the gift of his wisdom, but also the courage to pursue my studies far afield, into that inhospitable land which Theodore Adorno once called “the icy desert of abstraction.”

Two teachers at the University of Chicago, Norman Ingham and Paul Friedrich, helped me mature as a scholar by encouraging me to follow two disparate paths of exploring naming and listmaking: medieval Slavic letters and tropology. Two other distinguished members of the University of Chicago community, Bernard McGinn and James Fernandez, though never my teachers directly, shaped much of my thinking on this project with their own inspired writing. Last in a series of binary lists, I should also acknowledge two seminars that enriched my understanding of religious practices and everyday worship, leaving an imprint on much of my later work. In 1998–99



I spent a year at the Martin Marty Institute for Advanced Study of Religion at The University of Chicago's Divinity School. It was truly a baptism by fire, and I will always be grateful to Frank Reynolds for never making me feel like an outsider, even though I was. In 2003 I had the pleasure of participating in the Summer Faculty Seminar at Worcester, Massachusetts, "Religious Hermeneutics and Secular Interpretation," organized by the Erasmus Institute and led by the incomparable Geoffrey Hartman. In both settings I found not only fantastic colleagues, but also friends for life. (While at Worcester, my husband and I learned of the impending arrival of our daughter, Hannah, which made the experience even more memorable.)

I gratefully acknowledge the institutional support of Columbia University at crucial moments of my work on the book: two summer Council Grants in the Humanities and Social Sciences, and a semester of research leave extended into a whole precious year by a Chamberlain Fellowship for service at the Core. A summer Harriman PepsiCo travel grant supported two weeks of work in Venice and Rome in 2002, without which the last chapter of the book would not have been written, and three generous publication grants from the Harriman Institute have been invaluable for the manuscript's final preparation.

This project could never have been completed without extensive work in manuscript depositories, archives, and libraries around the world. I am particularly grateful to Father Mateja Matejic and Dr. Predrag Matejic for granting me access to the rich microform collection of Slavonic manuscripts in the Hilandar Resource Center for Medieval Studies at The Ohio State University, along with financial support and practical advice. My gratitude extends also to curators, librarians, and staff members in the archival divisions of the Serbian National Library in Belgrade; the National Library SS Cyril and Methodius in Sofia, Bulgaria; The Library of Congress in Washington, D.C.; the Vatican Library; and the Pontifical Oriental Institute in Rome.

Ideas that eventually found their way into this book have been presented at various scholarly centers, most notably the Osteuropa-Institut at the Free University of Berlin, the Slavic Department and the Department of Religious Studies at Northwestern University, the Committee on Medieval and Renaissance Studies at Columbia University, the Seminar on Slavic History and Culture at Columbia University, and the Department of Cyrillo-Methodian Studies at Sofia University in Bulgaria. I am in debt to my receptive audiences in all these venues.

Earlier versions of several chapters in this book have appeared in other publications: chapter 6 as "The Aetiology of the Seventy-Two Diseases:

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

xi

Investigating a Byzantino-Slavic False Prayer," in *Byzantinoslavica* (Prague) 59, no. 1 (1998): 181–95; chapter 7 as "From Babel to Christ and Beyond: The Number 72 in Christian Political Symbolism," in *Stara b"lgarska literatura* (Sofia) 35–36 (2007): 3–21; and chapter 8 as "The Peculiar Codex *Jerusalem* 22: Tracing the Slavic Kabbalah," in *Jews and Slavs: Slavic Manuscripts in the Holy Lands* (Jerusalem-Sofia: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and The Cyrillo-Methodian Research Center, forthcoming). I thank the people involved in these publications.

My debt of gratitude extends to dear friends and colleagues who have offered me the benefit of their scholarly expertise, encouragement, and practical support: Michael Agnew, Susan Boynton, Victor Friedman, Boris Gasparov, Petko Ivanov, Kostas Kazazis, Julia Kristeva, Leo D. Lefebure, John McGuckin, Katia Mitova, and Norman Pereira. Among those who have read drafts of the entire manuscript, I am particularly grateful to Robert Belknap, Paul Kollman, Moshe Taube, Lawrence Frizzell, Nadieszda Kizenko, and the profoundly generous anonymous reviewer at the University of Chicago Press. All of them have offered invaluable corrections, additions, and comments that have helped make this book far better than I could have made it on my own. I owe special thanks to my student and friend Marijeta Bozovic, who has improved my manuscript with labor and love, gracing it with her impeccable sense of style.

This book about things magical and mystical has had its fair share of serendipity, never more conspicuous than in the final phase of its promotion (which is perhaps fitting, since it is also a book about the social promotion of texts). My entire experience with the University of Chicago Press and the Harriman Publication Series has been a blessing. The present version of the book has benefited much from the competent advice of Elizabeth Branch Dyson and Ron Meyer, and from the technical assistance of Mary Fahnestock-Thomas. To David Brent, who has championed this project through thick and thin all the way to production, I owe much more than I can possibly express.

Still, my greatest debt is to my family: my parents, Bojana Popova and Angel Popov; my brother, Alexander Popov; my parents-in-law, Betty and Jim Kitson; my daughter, Hannah, and—more than anyone else—my husband, Tom Kitson, who, with his Scottish love of understatement, would never "let me count the ways." Thank you!





## INTRODUCTION

---

---

I do not aim foolishly to introduce new ideas. I want only to analyze and with some orderly detail to expand upon the truths so briefly set down by others.

—Dionysius the Areopagite, *The Divine Names*

As you set out for Ithaka,  
hope the voyage is a long one,  
full of adventure, full of discovery.

—C. Cavafy, *Ithaka*

“**B**lessed be the name of the Lord from this time on and forevermore. From the rising of the sun to its setting, the name of the Lord is to be praised,” exults the Psalmist (Ps. 113:2–3); and Jesus echoes him in his simplest lesson of devotion, “Pray then in this way: Our Father in heaven, hallowed be your name” (Matt. 6:9).<sup>1</sup>

“The name of God” is such a commonplace of Christian language that we often ignore it. Lulled by familiar references to “the name” and “in the name” of the Lord, we rarely stop to consider how the word *name* works in relation to its lofty referent. What exactly is God’s name? Is it hidden or revealed? Is it one or many? And if there are many, as the language of worship often suggests, can we know them all? By naming the creatures, Adam gained power over Creation. Could there be even greater power in knowing all the names of the Lord?

My subject in the following pages is a corner of the Christian experience where such questions have been made enormously significant both intellectually and existentially. My interest lies specifically in the practice of listing the names of God, a practice that often pluralizes the singular “name” of

biblical language in extravagantly abundant litanies and inventories of gargantuan proportions. The practice is widespread, and its numerous purposes defy easy generalizations. Lists of divine names are used across written and oral discourses to glorify and to instruct, to protect and to subjugate, and are equally at home in all quarters of Christian culture: from theology to liturgy and magic, and from official ceremonial practices to the practices of everyday life.

To be sure, such extensive production of sacronymic catalogues is not unique to Christianity. Virtually all theistic religions share the Christian zeal for embracing the divine realm in a list, whether through the names of numerous gods and goddesses or through the numerous names of a single divinity. Archaeological discoveries in Mesopotamia even suggest that the listing of sacred names was perhaps the oldest practice of writing, since it governed the written production of the Sumero-Babylonian “list-science” (*Listenwissenschaft*).<sup>2</sup> For my purposes, however, I register these contexts only as a spectacular backdrop for a focused, in-depth inquiry.

### Divine Names as Terms of Order

My study of Christian listmaking practices can be classified under the general rubric of rhetoric in the sense that it targets verbal performance and persuasion, the ability of words to produce social realities. Since I treat lists as rhetorical figures, or tropes, of serial arrangements, this project has particular affinities to the subfield of tropology—the discipline at the interface of poetics and rhetoric that Aristotle inaugurated to study verbal ingenuity and patterns of associative thought. The objectives of contemporary tropology branch along two analytical paths: formal and pragmatic. Formalists, primarily the linguists and the philosophers in the field, are interested in *what* a trope is, while pragmatists, best represented by cultural anthropologists (or the “an-trop-ologists,” as James Fernandez prefers to call them), investigate *how* a trope operates in social space.<sup>3</sup> My bias lies with the second group. When I claim that I am concerned with the Christian practice of listing God’s names, I mean not so much the way these lists are put together as the way they are put to use. What do lists do in Christian praxis? What is their locus in life, their internal justification, their enduring appeal for Christian communities? How does their performance change in shifting contexts? What do they accomplish for the people involved in their production and exchange? These and similar questions define the telos of this book.

Within the rhetorical discipline, my study is most at home in the niche carved by Kenneth Burke in his book *The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies*

in *Logology*. Burke's introductory stipulations illuminate my own purpose well:

[I]n this book we are to be concerned not directly with religion, but rather with the *terminology* of religion; not directly with man's relationship to God, but rather with his relationship to the word "God." Thus this book is about something so essentially rhetorical as religious nomenclature—hence the subtitle, "Studies in Logology," which is to say, "studies in words about words." . . . Since words-about-God would be as far-reaching as words can be, the "rhetoric of religion" furnishes a good instance of terministic enterprise in general.<sup>4</sup>

The key word in this passage is "nomenclature." Like Burke before me, I will be interested in religious rhetoric as a "terministic enterprise," in the potential of religious nomenclature not only to probe the limit (*terminus*) of language, but also to impose limits, boundaries, and restrictions on our picture of reality—in other words, to produce order.

With his typical aphoristic brilliance, Burke suggests that man is ruled by "a logic of entitlement,"<sup>5</sup> by the drive to sum up particulars under a single umbrella term toward ever higher levels of generalization. Searching for a title of titles, for an overarching "God-term," is the destiny of the symbolic animal, a part of the human condition. And because "God" is one of the better-known names for that terministic horizon, the search always has a religious aftertaste, even when its context is entirely secular. This, I suppose, makes religious nomenclature the most obvious territory for observing the "logic of entitlement" in action. Such, at least, has been the simple premise of my project.

Seeking to probe the terministic aspect of Christian rhetoric, I take as a case in point the most "far-reaching" of the "words-about-God"—the divine names—and propose to treat them as the ultimate Christian terms of order. Nomenclature does not by itself presuppose order, as classification does. Yet systematic knowledge tends to correlate the terms it uses with its own classifications—to correlate, as it were, its language and its vision of order—to the effect that its nomenclature becomes also a taxonomy.<sup>6</sup> And since Christianity offers a limiting case of such an enterprise, I claim that list-making, when used to organize the names of God, is a form of creating order. More specifically, I argue in the following chapters, from the point of view of particular texts in context, that a list of divine names, when articulated from a position of authority, seeks to impose a vision of order upon whole communities of Christians and shape their lives according to that vision.

Before engaging in the argument, however, let me first, by way of a general introduction, attempt a three-step explication of the highly condensed formula “imposition of a vision of order,” taking the term *order* as my point of departure.

### What Kind of Order?

Scholars have argued, in a number of theoretical idioms, that a representative aspect of religion is the human drive to make sense of everything, to indulge in a kind of “exegetical totalization”—in short, to propose universal order.<sup>7</sup> Abrahamic religions offer a perfect case in point, as one of their irreducible axioms is that human beings and matter both result from a single, creative consciousness, which itself transcends everything it generates. Such a hypothesis of origin presents the created world as a *cosmos* in the etymological sense of the term. Everything in this world is presumed to be radically contingent upon the free decision of the Creator. *Chance*, *accident*, *mistake* are but words to label the human inability to understand the logic of divine order. In the grand design of Providence, nothing lacks meaning or purpose: it is all part of a plan, part of a unified vision. Christianity, together with Judaism and Islam, thus offers a limiting case of a vision of order, with God the Creator as its single universal principle. (When Kenneth Burke claims that any “over-all term” is in essence a God-term, his implied notion of God is, of course, very Abrahamic if not entirely Christian.)<sup>8</sup>

Universal order may be appealing in itself, for it makes sense without a remainder, but it is not an easy concept to sell. The difficulty lies in the paradox implied in a vision of that scale: it is a vision of the *invisible*. Having to do more with imagination than with seeing, such a vision of order collapses, as it were, “the distinction between the physically visible and the visualized.”<sup>9</sup> It is an imaginative conception of reality that defies the naked eye by presupposing a metaphysical omniscience, a triumph of unrestrained imagination over the senses, which are always limited.

William James has claimed that such “unseen order” is perhaps the most basic category of religious life: “Were one asked to characterize the life of religion in the broadest and most general terms possible, one might say that it consists of the belief that there is an *unseen order*, and that the supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto.”<sup>10</sup> With this typically sweeping generalization, James suggests that what defines religious subjects as such is their acceptance of a vision of universal order as their own private reality (a “reality of the unseen”), a vision of order that informs both the epis-

temological context and the ethical horizon of their existence.<sup>11</sup> By translating thus the entire teleology of the religious experience in terms of “unseen order,” James in effect contends that the success of any religious project hinges on the ability to make people believe in an order they cannot see.

I leave aside for now the important question of agency and emphasize only one aspect of this paradoxical demand that is particularly relevant to the current discussion. Since the unseen predictably resists visual representation, its most natural rhetorical venue is language—the medium of total imagination. Leading religious communities to believe in an unseen order, in other words, depends almost exclusively on *verbal* rhetoric: a “rhetoric of the invisible” that concerns itself with the visionary aspect of religious order (or its “theoretical” aspect, if you will, since the term *theory* comes from the Greek word for “spectacle,” *thēoria*, and “to theorize,” *theōrein*, means literally “to make visible”).

If the rhetorical project of making people believe in what they cannot see is indeed fundamental to any religious enterprise as James suggests (and scholars of religion as different as Jonathan Z. Smith and Clifford Geertz appear to accept almost axiomatically), it is especially so for Christianity, where that concern has generated from the start a particularly strong sense of doctrinal urgency. Its most well-known biblical source is Jesus’s reproach to Doubting Thomas: “Have you believed because you have seen me? Blessed are those who have not seen and yet have come to believe” (John 20:29).

The scene occurs at a pivotal moment in Christian history when Jesus appears to his collected disciples a second time after the Resurrection. The first time, he delegated the authority for spreading the divine Word to the apostles (“As the Father has sent me, so I send you” [John 20:21]); now he sanctifies the entire body of the Church as recipients of the Word. The Christianity of the future will be made of those who believe not because they have witnessed the deeds, but because they have *heard* the message. The Thomas episode thus represents a crucial transformation of the Christian community from a society of direct disciples, or *eyewitnesses*, to a universal community of a *verbal* tradition. The ear, rather than the eye, becomes the organ of faith from now on, as the focus of the Christian experience shifts from the revelatory event (the Incarnation) to the text that proclaims it (the New Testament).<sup>12</sup>

These changes have at least two major consequences for our subject: they push the unseen to the forefront of the Christian imagination, and they make its verbal representation—“the rhetoric of the invisible”—crucial for the social (re)production of the Christian identity.<sup>13</sup> I argue in the following



chapters that lists of divine names play a strategic role in this new rhetoric as basic tools for making universal order *visible*—and thus operative—in the lives of Christian communities.

### Lists as Figures of Display

Shifting the focus to the visual component of my initial formula, let me now ask the question How can a list make order visible? What internal characteristic of the list trope makes a catalogue of divine names an effective vehicle for putting the unseen Christian order on display?

To begin to answer this question, I must first go back to the concept of nomenclature and consider its principal affinity to classification and order. An order system, at its most basic, classifies objects in categories, while a nomenclature provides the terms—or “names”—for these classes. Nomenclatures allow us to articulate a classification, to translate it from the realm of abstractions into the realm of words. Nomenclatures, of course, do not presuppose order by themselves; we can have, as we usually do in real life, terminologies that are more or less unsystematic. Yet the ambition of any systematic knowledge is to correlate its vision and its language of order so that its nomenclature becomes also a taxonomy, and it is this internal tendency, this asymptotic movement of nomenclature toward systematicity that is important for us. Now I cannot think of a more direct, economical, and effective articulation of any nomenclature than a list, which makes the list, ideally at least, the optimal articulation of a taxonomy as well. When we present the terms of order in a list, we represent the entire order system to which they belong, putting that system on display, so to speak, for everyone to see. That is what I mean when I claim that some lists make order visible.

Years ago I was told of a little boy who could not bear to have his toys put away. Each time his mother put them in a toy box, the boy would take them out and line them up across his room. “I need to see them,” he argued in his defense. “That is how I know that I have them.” I kept coming back to this example when I started thinking theoretically about lists. My hunch was that a mere *list* of the toys would have the same effect, for I imagined a verbal list to be a substitution for a lineup, its symbolic representation. It took another child to show me that in action.

Four years ago, when I was already deeply involved in this project, friends from Sweden came to visit with their two-year-old daughter, Dara. The first thing Dara did each morning of their stay was to list, in a solemn ritual of roll-call, all the children from her daycare center in Stockholm. It was a touching sight to see this little girl, still sleepy in her bed, reciting with

special care the names of her friends, pointing with each name to a particular place in a circle that remained invisible to the rest of us. The order of the names was always the same, probably the one her Swedish teacher used at home. And when her own name came up, Dara would point to herself and bow with a little smile, glad to be included in the circle, to be part of the order as she knew it. The listing ritual was clearly an exercise of verbal magic: of conjuring up the presence of her friends in their actual absence; of making them visibly there for her—for comfort and reassurance in her new experience of insecurity and isolation.

A list, then, is a symbolic *imposition* of a particular vision upon reality.<sup>14</sup> If, as I contend, the vision encoded in a list of divine names is nothing short of the metaphysical order on which the Christian experience of reality rests, then such a list is a basic rhetorical tool for the symbolic production of order in Christian society.

### What Is Symbolic Production of Order?

When I refer to the Christian production of order as “symbolic,” I align myself with the theoretical assumption that order is a symbolic enterprise grounded in the power of language to produce social realities. This position was first articulated as a coherent theory in the 1970s by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu.<sup>15</sup> For Bourdieu, order is a “vision of social di-vision” that has been collectively recognized and sanctioned as authoritative. The process of its social recognition is a matter of rhetoric: even when supported by the reality they claim to describe, classifications can be recognized only if they are first represented in symbolic form. Such an understanding of “symbolic production” makes explicit some hidden relations between authoritative speaking and order-making that allow us to position a rhetorical discussion of lists on firmer theoretical ground.

Bourdieu’s key term *symbolic capital* designates a particular relational aspect of order-making: symbolic production requires complicity between speaker and audience, a shared knowledge about the rules of the game, a shared belief in the structure of the social exchange and its stakes that allows the audience to recognize a given symbolic representation as legitimate.<sup>16</sup> The “symbolic” aspect of capital is its potential to be “recognized” (or indeed “misrecognized”) as power—the seemingly magical power of shaping reality by words alone. Symbolic capital, then, is nothing more than a veritable credit of trust that the members of a group invest in a person, granting him the right to speak for all of them and, in so doing, to shape the reality in which they live.<sup>17</sup> The group typically misrecognizes this privilege as a

personal power of authority instead of recognizing it properly as the “pure fiduciary value” that it is—their own very personal investment of trust and hope.

This process of public recognition hinges on *naming* rituals that Bourdieu calls “rites of institution”: the ordination of a priest, the inauguration of a president, the crowning of a king, the convocation of a college graduate. Clearly, by *name* we are to understand in this context a definition of social distinction that determines the precise coordinates—the “address”—of a person in the social field. If the imposition of a name is an act of public investment of symbolic capital in a professional who thereby becomes an embodiment of power, we may say that the name itself functions in Bourdieu’s model as an atom of social order—the very instrument by which order is imposed upon social reality.<sup>18</sup>

Having thus established an explicit connection between symbolic production and order-making, Bourdieu takes it a step further by linking the growth of symbolic capital directly to the struggle over the legitimate vision of order. Once the members of a group invest symbolic capital in a social agent, they expect him to turn a profit—to augment their investment in the form of added honor and prestige. Since his distinctive power is “the power of constituting the given through utterances, of making people see and believe [the invisible and the incredible],” the specific product expected from such a spokesperson is a visionary one: the annunciation of a vision of order.<sup>19</sup> And if his initial professional capital grants him the right to advertise his private vision in the market of symbolic goods, we measure his ultimate success by the willingness of the group to buy into his vision and embrace it as their own social reality.

While my concern with symbolic production is informed by Bourdieu’s theory, my practice is governed by priorities that are far removed from his own. Bourdieu the sociologist is interested mostly in the potential of symbolic capital to effect social change by reinforcing social inequality. My concern is not with the social results but with the rhetorical mechanisms of this process, with *verbal strategies* such as listmaking that shape the symbolic representation of order, making it socially recognizable. Furthermore, unlike Bourdieu, who is preoccupied with the careers of the authority figures involved in producing order, I call attention to the social promotion of *texts* that embody authoritative visions of order. For a medievalist, such a preference is a matter not only of professional bias, but also of necessity: the rites, rituals, and rivalries related to the imposition of order in medieval communities have reached us only in the form of textual traces.

## The Material

I focus in this book on the careers of two texts, each remarkable in its own right. The texts form an unlikely pair at first sight: one of them is a theological treatise, the other a protective amulet. What makes them equally relevant for our discussion, despite the obvious dissimilarities, is their shared interest in listing the names of the Lord. And what makes them stand out together in the long tradition of this trope in Christian culture is their ambition to offer the definitive list, to exhibit *all* the names of the Lord from a position of authority.

The very possibility of such a gesture, of course, has everything to do with successful social promotion, which is always the result of extratextual factors, of specific (though often anonymous) actors pursuing their own agendas with respect to the texts they promote. It was a triumphant career across both time and space that ensured, in each case, the public recognition of our texts as loci of religious authority and symbolic power. That is why this book begins and ends with a historical narrative about the career of a text (chapters 1 and 10). The two success stories sample well the varieties of religious experience in the field of Christian logology, for the equally intense expression of social renown in each case is rooted in opposite practices exhibiting alternative positions on the Word and the Name, and on the ways the two could shape social realities in a Christian context. The recognition of the theological treatise manifested itself as a continual hermeneutic effort, documented in a substantial body of commentaries and translations that literally produced an “out-standing” text. This text, like a burning bush, was seen as perpetually instructive, inextinguishable, forever drawing new readers into its circle of significance.<sup>20</sup> In the second case, recognition took the form of a devoted use of the text itself as an instrument of power. Every amulet in active use is an embodiment of the public trust in its power to make real the order it represents; and the more visibly and abundantly it is being used, the faster its symbolic capital grows.

The theological text that I have chosen as the center of analysis in the first part of this book is the well-known Greek treatise *The Divine Names*, which belongs to the historically first Christian corpus of systematic theology. The author of the corpus presented himself as St. Dionysius the Areopagite, a first-century Athenian converted by St. Paul, although the texts were evidently written much later, close to the time when they first came into the public eye in the sixth century. Due to a cluster of factors that I examine in chapter 1, the corpus (including our text) was the focus of intense

exegetical labor almost from the start, and the intensity only increased with time. The result was an interpretive project that remains unique in Christian history outside of the biblical canon, a project that invested the corpus with an authority second only to that of the Bible itself. Nineteenth-century philology's definitive proof that the near-apostolic authorship of the corpus was an elaborate hoax did little to impugn its authority. If anything, it made the text's value even more obvious. For the real "authority" of the corpus is measured by the enormous intellectual energy distilled into its rereading, by the trust—the credence—with which generation upon generation of Christians have approached the beautifully opaque texts of the Pseudo-Dionysius as a mirror in which they can confront the central dilemma of their own intellectual identity: what it means to believe in a divinity beyond comprehension—in a *theos* beyond *logos*—and to make, in the face of such a radical otherness, a *theology* by which they can live as they believe.

All these familiar facts from the career of the Areopagitical Corpus present the treatise *The Divine Names* as the most authoritative formulation of the Christian theological position on the names of God. The gist of this position is the formula "God is both nameless and of every name," which I explicate both against the tradition of the Christian theology of the Name and against the comprehensive theological vision that Dionysius proposed in his work (chapters 2 and 3). What is particularly significant for me in the context of the current discussion is that Dionysius frames all principal questions about the names of God directly with respect to his overarching concern with divine order (or the "hierarchies," as he preferred to call them, thus coining one of the most powerful terms in our cultural vocabulary of order).

While the contribution of the Pseudo-Areopagite to Christian thought has been studied from every angle imaginable, there has been little reflection on the relation of his theology of the Name to Christian rhetorical practices. Even less has been done to address the interrelation of his theory with the continual Christian practice of listing the names of the unnamable Divinity. My rereading of this familiar text is intended to explore such an unfamiliar territory. What I propose in chapter 4, as the outcome of a long journey into the world of Dionysius, is that his treatise endorses the open-ended list of divine names as the "proper" name of God while regulating membership in this ideal list through biblical exegesis. The practical consequence for Christian rhetoric was what Bourdieu would call the "theory effect."<sup>21</sup> It made explicit practices that had typified Christian rhetoric from the start by

cloaking them with theological legitimacy, which is to say that the treatise *The Divine Names* placed all its authority—the authority it had borrowed from St. Dionysius the Areopagite—behind the open-ended list of biblical terms for the Lord and, in so doing, produced this trope as a recognizable authoritative pattern for articulating the terms of Christian order. The rest, as the saying goes, is history. As the symbolic capital of the treatise grew beyond the control of its author, spectacularly magnifying the initial impact of his theory, so did the authority of the trope itself.

The text that forms the center of my second case study is a Slavonic amulet known as *The 72 Names of the Lord*, whose earliest copies date from the end of the thirteenth century. Its employment as an amulet is declared directly in the text itself: it is to be worn on the body as protection from “every evil.” From the outset we can discern at the heart of this text a double contrast with Dionysius’s position. In place of the open-ended list of God-terms that Dionysius promoted, the amulet offers a closed numerical series. No less conspicuously, it repositions the list of divine names from the speculative field of theology into the field of apotropaic practices, where it is mobilized not as a prop in pursuit of the Good but as a protective shield against evil.

The respective scholarly careers of the two texts reveal further distinctions. Unlike the Areopagite’s treatise, the amulet is virtually unstudied, though its solid tradition through the nineteenth century makes it perhaps the best-documented Slavonic list of divine names and one of the most popular amulets of its type in Christian practice. The profusion of gaps and dark spots in our knowledge of this text imposed a rather specific set of priorities and methodological choices on my approach. As a result, the second part of this book appears to be almost incongruous with the first in its language and frame of reference, even in its disciplinary locus. On the face of it, the study is cast as a literary “microhistory” that speculates through the exploration of a single, small-scale phenomenon about a large area of cultural diffusion. Though I never pursue mythological reconstructions or aim to master quite the same scope of dispersion as Carlo Ginzburg, this study resembles, in its general thrust, Ginzburg’s famous microhistorical projects and shares their heterogeneity of subject and form.<sup>22</sup>

My inquiry begins with a question about the number 72—the element that not only sets our talismanic list apart from the orthodox tradition, but also provides both the formal and the conceptual matrix of this list. Subscribing to the assumption that the number has a shared Judeo-Christian symbolism, I explore clusters of 72-fold concepts that abound in the written

production of the Semito-Hellenic world. The goal of the quest is to recover behind the apparent heterogeneity of these concepts a common network of meaning—a unified vision of order—and to identify the particular channels through which it could have informed Slavic magic practices (chapters 5, 6, and 7).

The results of this extensive experiment become visible in the last three chapters of the book. I demonstrate, over a large body of textual traces, that *The 72 Names of the Lord* has its roots in the Gnostic Kabbalah and originates from a Kabbalo-Christian exchange that most probably took place in Provence in the twelfth century (chapters 8 and 9). Such a conclusion posits our text as one of the earliest cases of Kabbalistic influence on Christian practice, considerably predating the “discovery” of the Kabbalah by the European Humanists in the 1490s. I further prove, on the basis of indisputable textual evidence, that the Slavonic amulet was directly dependent on Provençal sources, contrary to the prevailing opinion among scholars that it was a translation from Greek (chapter 9).

Unlike my first case study, which begins by establishing the authority of Dionysius, my discussion of *The 72 Names* has the opposite trajectory: it concludes with the moment in history that pushed the amulet to the mainstream of Slavic culture and produced it as a highly recognizable Christian list of divine names (chapter 10). This most glorious chapter in the history of the text begins in Venice in 1520, when the Slavonic amulet was first set in print. The following century saw several highly successful editions of *The 72 Names* that, in effect, transformed this previously obscure magical artifact into a popular commodity on the emerging Slavic book market. The process has a number of intriguing implications, though what interests me here is chiefly the fact that it invested the amulet with significant religious authority. And even though the sociocultural context in which the promotion of the amulet took place is radically different from the context that distinguished Dionysius’s treatise, the symbolic power attached to the texts in both situations is comparable.

The apparent discord between my two case studies thus collapses in the end into a unity of focus and purpose. The unlikely pairing of one of the most visible texts in Christian theology with an amulet of obscure, heterodox origin and rather provincial fame proves to illuminate a common concern at the heart of Christian culture. The two texts represent—from their respective positions of authority in the Christian field—two alternative models for listing the names of God that coexist, more or less unproblematically, in Christian practice: the open-ended list, and the closed, numerical catalogue that defines the limit of expansion by a particular number. Both of these

types of listmaking presume to be exhaustive, though their distinct views of the nature of God's names determine the different teleological horizons of their shared ambition for totality. Each has its own representative locus in Christian culture. The open-ended list typifies the orthodox theological position on the limits of naming God as an interminable endeavor both reflecting upon and reflected in the official Christian rhetoric of infinity. The closed list, by contrast, represents subaltern landscapes of Christian practice—often called “magic”—where divine names are placed directly in human service to ensure protection and well-being.

The two texts, when counterpoised as a contrastive pair, not only illuminate a set of theoretical questions about making lists and making order in Christian culture, but also mutually illuminate one another, revealing in each other aspects that remain otherwise eclipsed. Without the background of *The Divine Names*, we cannot adequately understand the enormous effort distilled into redressing *The 72 Names of the Lord* as a truly Christian text by way of legitimating the names in the list according to Dionysius's standards. (The compiler of the printed version went so far as to include in the amulet itself an exegetical passage, thus incorporating biblical exegesis—prescribed by Dionysius as a requirement for the proper listing of the names—directly into the making of the list proper.) No less importantly, the explicit correlation of sacred order and divine names in the project of Dionysius conditions us to recognize the equivalents in other spheres of Christian practice where it is not necessarily as striking (including magic). Conversely, *The 72 Names of the Lord*, being itself an overdetermined list that is both closed and defined by a particular number, pushes to the forefront the list-pattern itself and forces us to identify the significance of listmaking in Dionysius's own project. The dual theoretical focus of this book—a focus on order *and* lists—thus emerges directly from the unorthodox juxtaposition of my two privileged texts.

If indeed, as I have suggested here, there is a direct relationship between the production of sacred order and the pronouncement of a list of divine names from a position of authority, our two highly visible lists should represent two alternative visions of Christian order. Moreover, since, for Christianity, order is also an ethical system, Christian cosmological imagination is always already a moral imagination. We are to expect, therefore, that the list of divine names would function in the Christian context not only as an epistemological figure but also as a motivational gesture, as a scenario for social behavior. My analyses put these conjectures to the test, treating them as open questions rather than as axioms. What does it mean to live “in the name of the Lord” when his name can be either an open-ended list or a closed



numerical series? Does it make a difference which option you choose? Are the two compatible?

By posing such questions as our distant goal—our Ithaka, as Cavafy would say—we doubt not that the quest will be a long one. So, with hope for adventure and discovery, we are ready to embark.<sup>23</sup>





## EPILOGUE

---

---

What remains?

—Jacques Derrida, *Glas*

The rose remains in the name alone,  
we hold the naked names . . .

—Bernard of Morval, *De contemptu mundi*

The boundless cannot be bound!

—Kuzma Prutkov, *Aphorisms*

**W**e began our journey with two texts and two conjectures. The texts were chosen to represent two alternative models for listing the names of God: an open-ended list and a closed series of 72 names. Both lists presume to be exhaustive. Their respective understandings of “all,” however, are not identical. If they both comply with the axiom of monotheist onomatology that the single divinity has many names, each reflects a different position as to exactly how many they are. Theology vouches for an infinite number. Magic counters with 72, the numerical equivalent of finitude. The reasons behind such a radical split within the Christian practice of the name are not immediately obvious, and neither are its consequences. We can hypothesize, but we cannot assert anything before studying the two cases that manifest the split and getting to the bottom of how they emerged on the cultural scene, what they represented for whom, and how they were put to use.

Two simple conjectures guided our studies: that the names of God in Christianity are basic terms of sacred order, and that a list of such terms is itself an effective rhetorical tool for promoting visions of order. If that is indeed the case, the two alternative lists of divine names—the finite and

the infinite—strive to impose upon social reality two alternative patterns of unity and coherence. In other words, they argue for two alternative models of Christian behavior.

The effort to test these assumptions took us much further in time and space than we originally intended. The initial questions kept increasing in number and difficulty the deeper we went into the messy collocation of texts, gaps, and contradictions that make up the available material. Our study of order, which repeatedly confronted the disturbing tendency of practice to transgress the limits it creates, embodied part of the same dynamic between order and disorderliness: it resorted to disjointed narratives and indecorous juxtapositions of subjects. Moreover, it came to acknowledge openly those breaks in the logic of practice that no theory can effectively erase.

Despite the uncertainties, a pattern—I will call it theological, for clarity—began to emerge by chapter 3, and it became more and more distinct as its alternative—the magical vision—appeared in full view in chapter 8. At that point it was tempting to conclude that the two visions of order are ideological rivals, that the second contests the first, especially since we already knew that it had its roots outside Christian thought, in Gnosticism and the Kabbalah. Yet the more we learned about the 72 *Names* in the Christian context, the less plausible such an easy explanation became. Before attempting a theoretical rearrangement of the historical narratives, however, let us first outline the two visions as they emerged from the narratives themselves.

### Two Visions of Order

The central pronouncement of Christian theology on the naming of God—attributed to the authority of St. Dionysius the Areopagite—endorses the infinite list of names as the most adequate “name” for the unnamable divinity. This ideal list is envisioned as hierarchically ordered on an ascending scale of adequacy: from symbolic to conceptual names and to the collapse of naming in mystical silence. While symbolic names (such as “Lamb”) index biblical narratives and thus represent specific scenarios for action, conceptual names (such as “Love”) signify key Christian values. Despite their internal stratification, however, all names designate not a divine identity (God being beyond the reach of language), but a table of differentiations within the created world. Each name establishes a coordinate for evaluating human positions in the social sphere, and all of them in their unity chart our ascent to the divine, the route of human deification. The order implied in the names of the list, in other words, manifests the Creator directly within the confines of the created world in order to show a way out of these confines.

Such order resembles a ladder that, when properly used, negates itself, for it leads to its own beyond. We may conclude that the theological vision emerging from the text of Dionysius presents an asymmetrical system of order that posits its “beyond” as its condition of possibility—a transcendent divinity exempt from the order it generates.

The idea of order presented by the amulet *The 72 Names of the Lord* is based on an entirely different principle. The arrangement of the names in the list does not represent a particular vision of order. Instead, the list is circumscribed structurally as well as semantically by the number 72—a well-established Judeo-Christian symbol of limits and ideal totality. We observed, in abundant and rather heterogeneous Christian material, that *The 72 Names of the Lord* is the matrix for proliferating other lists of 72 members: the 72 names of the Theotokos, the 72 languages, disciples of Christ, prophets, and various personifications of evil (such as the 72 demons, the 72 hypostases of the child-stealing witch Gylou). We also recovered a much larger repertoire of 72-fold concepts where the potential list is represented by its “principle,” as Stephen Barney calls it, which is to say, by the numerical topos alone.<sup>1</sup> In either form—as condensed to a topos, or extended into a list—these concepts tend to cluster in list-structures, as catalogues of all things that are 72 in number, or as corpora of 72-fold lists. The cumulative effect of this copious listmaking is a universal vision of perfect symmetry and finitude predicated on the number of the Creator’s names. Its totalizing ploy is the exact opposite of Dionysius’s strategy. While the theological vision of order is produced symbolically by a single, infinite list of divine names that approaches its unnamable referent only asymptotically, magic arrests our imagination within a self-enclosed and self-referential universe by rhetorically amassing an open set of finite, perfectly homologous lists that mirror, each in its 72-fold structure, the master list of the Master’s names.

Two views of the world emerge from this comparison—two ways of making sense of human reality. The first world, as imagined by Dionysius, is open to a “yonder,” to the possibility of becoming something that it is not. To live in such a world means living not with definitive answers but with provisional assumptions. Its order is only a temporary one. It prepares us to abandon our most cherished assumptions, as Dionysius abandons the names of God, yet abandon them respectfully, with utmost gratitude. For it also teaches us that without those crutches, without the support of that temporary order, we would never have made it this far. As Dionysius’s order holds the promise of its own negation, it both humbles us about our limitations and inspires us to believe that we can overcome them. Thus

the reality it represents is an endlessly demanding world that makes human perfectionism possible. For only the hope that, in some radically other life, we can be perfect could give us the courage to face our inadequacies here and now, and spend our lives trying to rise above them. Such a world does not sound very inviting. As in a Gothic cathedral, a person feels dizzy with awe, and a little lost—too small for an order of that magnitude.

By contrast, the alternative world—the world as imagined by magic—is built with human measure in mind, not only indulging, but even encouraging our human flaws. There is “no there there,” no remainder, no beyond; all is here, and all is known. It is a world of complete interiority which, like a home—or a cave, if you prefer a Platonic trope—lulls us into the illusion that the world outside does not really exist. Since we are comfortable here, we must also be safe. It is minimally challenging because it implies no possibility for transformation. Its inhabitants know everything there is to know, which is the same thing each time. The promise is not ecstasy but stasis, maintaining the status quo, and the goal is not discovery or freedom (both problematic in their troublesome unpredictability), but safety and control, the healthy reinforcement of a few simple truths that allow us to ignore the rest.

### Religion, Need, and Desire: A Reorientation

Those familiar with the ethical system of Emmanuel Levinas will hear in these descriptions echoes of his dual ethical model of “totality” and “infinity.”<sup>2</sup> The correspondences are so thick, it is almost as if Levinas had our material in mind when building his model. Some of the categories he adopts to chart his distinctions are identical with those that emerge from our own analyses: finitude and infinity, interiority and exteriority. Others suggest instructive new implications: the “totalizers,” in his idiom, are egocentrics who are downward-bound, preoccupied with material concerns, whereas the “infiniteizers” are centered on the Other, their bodies “raised upward,” “in the direction of heights,” in an endless pursuit of the “spiritual.” (At this point we are tempted to recall also Simone Weil’s version of the same dichotomy: “gravity and grace,” and the “wings” that she chooses for her controlling trope of grace.)<sup>3</sup>

Most instructive in the analysis of Levinas, however, is the correspondence that he posits between totality and need on the one hand, and infinity and desire on the other. The opposition between need and desire is a topos in postmodern thought that has been dealt with in a variety of ways in diverse theoretical systems, but the objectives of Levinas, with his intense ethical

concern for order and the Other, are the closest to our own.<sup>4</sup> For Levinas, desire is always metaphysical: it is the yearning for “something else entirely,” for the absolute Other. As such, it can never be satisfied but feeds instead on its own hunger.<sup>5</sup> “Desire,” he proposes, is “a movement ceaselessly cast forth, an interminable movement toward a future never future enough.”<sup>6</sup> Needs, conversely, are existential dependencies with regard to the world. “Material” needs, he calls them—for food and drink, for clothes, shelter, and contact—and, because they are material, “admitting of satisfaction.”<sup>7</sup> From the viewpoint of behavior driven by needs, it is the “I” that matters: its philosophy is “I need, and I deserve.” And, as in our magical model, the homogenization that the materially hungry human subject effects on his perception of reality produces a world of perfect interiority. In sharp contrast to the infinity-bound subject of metaphysical desire, an inhabitant of a need-driven world lives in “contentment with the finite without concern for the infinite.”<sup>8</sup>

Behind the surface split that we observed in the field of Christian rhetoric, the split between infinite (or asymmetrical) and finite (symmetrical) listmaking, we may begin to discern now, with the help of Levinas, a deeper dichotomy that cuts through the core of Christianity as a way of life, a dichotomy that we may wish to reinterpret in terms of a need-desire polarity. Two ways of Christian life emerge, two kinds of human relationship with the divine.

The way of metaphysical desire implies an exclusive relationship with a personal divinity defined by the longing for absolute perfection. It requires perpetual labor in response to the uninterrupted presence of the divine, labor that is believed to empower the individual for a radical transformation. The alternative way, informed by existential needs, presupposes conversely a contractual—and rather “open”—relationship with the other world. It emphasizes not individual perfection but material well-being. Moreover, human gratification is understood in a very immediate sense, unlike the yonder-fixed, desire-based behavior that places all its hopes in the world to come.

The representative locus of a need-driven religious praxis is the existential crisis: we observe this model in its purest form when disaster strikes, when death, destruction, and chaos threaten to take the upper hand in immediate human reality. Such result-oriented religious behavior has little concern for ecclesiastical norms and doctrinal purity, just as a drowning person could not care less about proper bureaucratic procedures and hierarchies. In a moment of crisis, a religious subject desperately reaches to all available otherworldly forces for help, with no concern for their doctrinal

status. What is important is that the crisis is overcome; the questions “how” and “by whom” are irrelevant. Hence, we may observe a peculiar, promiscuous behavior toward the other world, in sharp contrast with the unconditional loyalty demanded by the path of metaphysical desire. The loyalties and trusts of this down-to-earth religious pragmatism are all conditional: the most respected otherworldly force is the one that has recently proven to be the most helpful. Using a modern analogy, we may say that in this system the person is not, as the desire model would have it, an exclusive lover of God, but a client who is free to choose from an array of supernatural providers.

Put in another idiom, need-driven religious life is focused on miracles. The chief solace that it offers its practitioners is the sheer possibility of miraculous events. Unlike the desire-based model, which requires a radical denial of the self, with no material proof of any reward whatsoever, a miracle promises maximal gratification for only minimal effort. A miracle is not a reward for a job well done, it is not proportionally distributed to all according to some logical criterion; quite the contrary: it is completely extraordinary, an exemption from the habitual order of things. Doctrinally speaking, the Almighty can perform miracles because he himself is exempt from the order he generates. Miracles thus are supposed to depend entirely on the will—or the whim—of God. Yet the biblical precedents of miraculous help from above encourage humans to dream of producing miracles upon demand, be it by prayer or coercion. *Magic* is a cover term for various techniques of binding the divine to conform to human will against the established order or—which is the same thing—to make God make miracles that fit our specific need of the moment.

While these two hypothetical religious ways—of metaphysical desire and existential need—are indeed alternatives open to every believer, they clearly do not have the same cachet with everyone in the religious field. Of the two, the path of desire is far steeper, far more demanding and forbidding. While Dionysius’s hunger for a “beyond” holds the irresistible promise of holistic and authentic experiences, it demands an intensity and ethical maximalism that few can sustain as a way of life. And luckily so, for otherwise humanity would be threatened by extinction, economically as well as biologically.<sup>9</sup> The option that, for most people most of the time, appears more practicable and accessible is the one defined by existential need. The need-driven religiosity of all those who wear the 72 *Names* “just in case” represents the silent majority in the field of religion. Its mass appeal is not hard to explain: it offers a workable model for coping with the anxieties of everyday life, here and now, something that the elegant system of Dionysius—



with its qualifications and dialectics and its focus on “a future never future enough”—fails to provide.

Levinas is instructive on this point as well. For him, desire requires distance from needs: “Having recognized its needs as material needs, as capable of being satisfied, the I can henceforth turn to what it does not lack. It distinguishes the material from the spiritual, opens to Desire.”<sup>10</sup> A brief recourse to one of the major theoretical idioms of our discussion may add further points of reference. Pierre Bourdieu, reinterpreting the same relation in sociological terms (as a class distinction, as a matter of social distance), would replace the Levinasian desire with what he calls a “theoretical relation to the world.” Such a relation requires distance from necessity, in contrast to the “practical” position of those who “do not have the freedom to distance the world.”<sup>11</sup> Thus both thinkers, despite their distinct theoretical priorities, link the desire model to privilege: as a way of life, it belongs to the elite who can afford the leisure to desire.<sup>12</sup> Without those who lack the means to live with the metaphysical hunger of Dionysius, being forced instead to exist by the dictates of their needs, Dionysius—and his vision—could never have had a place in Christian life.

How are we to evaluate the dynamic of need and desire in the field of religion? We assumed early on in this book that whatever hypothetical visions the two different forms of listmaking propose, they must be ideological rivals, alternatives that mutually negate one another. Such a conjecture arose from the presumption that theology and magic occupy two opposing—even conflicting—positions in the Christian field. The presumption is too familiar, and reiterated in too many idioms, to require much attention here. I need only mention the ubiquitous magic/religion dichotomy that every scholar of religion with interests outside the orthodox norm seems compelled to use, while lamenting its multiple inadequacies.<sup>13</sup> Other dichotomies are even less satisfactory, but equally instructive. Each offers a contrasting pair of terms that reserves an unquestionably positive qualification for the orthodox center (religion as it should be) and opposes to it an inferior “other” that is plagued by a variety of deficiencies. It is “popular,”<sup>14</sup> “syncretic,”<sup>15</sup> “easy,”<sup>16</sup> that is, corrupted, contaminated, or profaned; or, in a word, removed from the respectable norm. This is religion as it should *not* be, but unfortunately is.<sup>17</sup>

To redefine the same split in terms of need and desire, understood as formative principles of religious practice, means to articulate it in less evaluative terms, to shift the discussion to more neutral ground. Yet the chief advantage of this approach, I believe, lies in its potential to unmask the fallacious representation of “magic” as a kind of parasite on the body of

“religion.” As we saw, the Levinasian pair of need and desire has exactly the opposite dynamic: desire presupposes needs and their fulfillment, not vice versa. Observing Christian practice through this theoretical screen allows us to acknowledge the dependence of elite or professional Christianity on the need-driven religious practice of the multitudes.<sup>18</sup> In the same breath I argue, extending further the model of Levinas, that desire is inscribed in the need model as its ideal horizon: it provides an impossible standard against which others can measure the seriousness of their religious commitments. Thus, the “need” and the “desire” models of Christian living are both indispensable parts of Christianity, as they are mutually dependent on one another. They sustain one another not as alternatives, but as a complementary pair of behavioral choices that, by balancing out the equally strong human longing for power *and* freedom (for “gravity *and* grace”), makes Christianity a viable religious system.

Such a hypothesis implies, contrary to popular assumption, that Christianity does not propose a single, unified vision of order.<sup>19</sup> Part of the historical struggle of Christianity to become a world religion can be seen as a struggle to make room for the two—apparently incompatible—visions of order that our material reveals: an asymmetrical order rooted in metaphysical desire, and a symmetrical order that revolves around material needs. A good way to observe their complementarity directly, and in distinctly historical terms, is to examine the Christian cult of saints. As it emerged in late antiquity, the cult of saints was a radical expression of metaphysical desire, promoting martyrs—including those who pursued the “slow” ascetic martyrdom of the flesh—as paradigms for a Christlike life on earth. In the sixth century, however, when Christianity began to dominate the religious life of the Roman Empire, and its membership exploded, the cult of saints gradually shifted its focus to existential needs, redefining saints predominantly as miracle workers.<sup>20</sup>

### The Danger of Closures

A couple of weeks ago a student of mine who was particularly taken by my desire/need hypothesis asked me a question that took me by surprise. Is my project itself need- or desire-based? Much as I have been preoccupied with this dichotomy, I had never before applied it to my own intellectual practices. Pushed to the wall, I had to admit to myself that, even though this project is ostensibly need-driven (after all, this study is supposed to make me tenurable), it is a purebred product of desire. This may explain why it has always felt—as it still does, up to this final page—virtually unfinishable.

This realization suddenly empowered me to acknowledge that the only way I could end my book was to admit, facetiously, that it is indeed without an end. And what better way to do so than to recall one of the best texts written on the subject of divine names outside the realms of theology and magic: a short story by Arthur C. Clarke entitled “The Nine Billion Names of God.”<sup>21</sup>

The story, a classic of science fiction written in the 1950s, envisions all of human history as teleologically organized by a single goal: the writing of a list that contains all the possible names of God. This monumental project was initiated, we are told, by a Buddhist lamasery in Tibet many centuries ago. Until recently, this colossal undertaking was deemed only vaguely commensurable with human limitations: the calculated time for its completion was about fifteen thousand years, which makes it, from the point of view of a human life—even of the life of a human institution, such as the Tibetan lamasery—a project open to infinity. Yet modern technology, represented in the story by an efficient New York computer company, boldly reduces infinity to a hundred days. Only when the computer is already programmed and set in motion, and the process of speedy listmaking becomes irreversible, is the real meaning of the project revealed. It is nothing less than a project for the End. For once the list is completed, mankind will have fulfilled its purpose and reached its final destination. And so, while the last names of God are coming out of the printer, the story about the end of the world comes to an abrupt close: “Overhead, without any fuss, the stars were going out.”<sup>22</sup>

Some things may be better left unfinished . . .



## NOTES

---

### INTRODUCTION

1. All references to the Bible follow the New Revised Standard Version (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
2. Von Soden, "Leistung und Grenze"; cf. Jack Goody, *Domestication of the Savage Mind*, 74–111.
3. With regard to the formalists, see, for example, Black, *Models and Metaphors*; Ricoeur, *Rule of Metaphor*; Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*; and Lakoff and Turner, *More Than Cool Reason*. With regard to the pragmatists, see, for example, Lévi-Strauss, *Savage Mind*; Tambiah, "Magical Power of Words"; Sapir and Crocker, *Social Use of Metaphor*; and particularly, the "an-trop-ology" of Fernandez in his *Persuasion and Performance, Beyond Metaphor*, and, with Huber, *Irony in Action*.
4. Burke, *Rhetoric of Religion*, vi.
5. *Ibid.*, 25
6. See Foucault, *Order of Things*, 208. Note that any classificatory system is a complex mental construct that, although it depends on basic cognitive processes, is always socially embedded. Each society operates simultaneously with multiple systems of classification whose taxa may overlap, and whose differentiating boundaries may sometimes be rather fuzzy (see, e.g., Lévi-Strauss, *Savage Mind*, 139).
7. The phrase "exegetical totalization" comes from Jonathan Z. Smith, who offers one of the most engaging presentations of the religious ambition for total order. Significantly for us, his entire argument revolves around the role of lists in religious practice (see *Imagining Religion*, esp. 44–48).
8. Burke, *Rhetoric of Religion*, 25–26.
9. This prudent qualification comes from Northrop Frye's *Words with Power* (70). The connection between *vision* and *imagination* is a topos in Western culture. William Blake, for example, used the two terms interchangeably: "Vision or Imagination is a Representation of what eternally exists, Really and Unchangeably," he wrote in 1810 in "A Vision of the Last Judgment" (*Complete Poetry and Prose*, 555). In a similar vein, Shakespeare famously defined the three paradigmatic "visionaries"—the lunatic, the lover, and the poet—as being "of imagination all compact" (*A Midsummer Night's Dream*, act 5, scene 1.)

10. This is the opening sentence of James's lecture entitled "The Reality of the Unseen," the third of his Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion, which he delivered at the University of Edinburgh in 1901–02 and then published in his classic study *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. Most succinctly, he formulated religious belief as "a belief in an object which we cannot see" (61). Incidentally, Levinas, in *Totality and Infinity*, defines metaphysical desire—the desire for transcendence—in exactly the same idiom of the unseen, naming it "Desire for the Invisible" (33).

11. In a similar vein Clifford Geertz argues, in his essay "Religion as a Cultural System," that the vision of universal order is both an ontological and an ethical foundation of religious life. Having established that the main function of religious symbols is "to synthesize a people's ethos, . . . their most comprehensive ideas of order," he goes on to propose one of the most elegant and influential formulas in contemporary anthropological studies of religion: "Religious symbols formulate a basic congruence between a particular style of life and a specific (if, most often, implicit) metaphysics, and in so doing sustain each with the borrowed authority of the other" (*Interpretation of Cultures*, 90).

12. Cf. Rom. 10:17: "So faith comes from what is heard, and what is heard comes through the words of Christ." Note also that both the Greek term *enōtizein* and its Slavic calque *v"noushiti* (to instill, to convince) etymologically mean "to put something in one's ear," from Greek *en-*, Slavic *v"-* (in), and *ous-* / *ōtos-*, *oukh-/oush-* (ear).

13. The rhetorical form of the dictum is part of the message as well. Jesus uses the same beatitude formula—"Blessed are they"—that he uses in the Sermon on the Mount to link a particular type of Christian attitudes and actions to a direct promise of a reward in heaven (Matt. 5:3–11; cf. Luke 6:20–23). The formula's recurrence in the story of Thomas puts a clear soteriological spin on the ability to believe without seeing. The only other occasion in which Jesus uses this formula outside the Sermon on the Mount is a passage in Luke that describes the exorcising of demons. "Blessed is the womb that bore you and the breast that nursed you," says a woman who has witnessed Jesus's power over the evil spirits, to which the Christ responds, "Blessed rather are those who hear the word of God and obey it" (Luke 11:27–28). The formal parallelism between the corresponding passages in Luke and John points to a deeper semantic correspondence between "those who have not seen" and "those who have heard." Thus the very choice of rhetorical patterns in the Thomas episode amplifies further the triumph of the verbal over the visual.

14. A similar insight is proposed by Patti White, who calls listmaking directly "an imposition of order" and treats lists as "the very embodiment of order" (*Gatsby's Party*, 20–21). Significantly, this insight is brought about not by a study of religion but of postmodern British and American literature, a radically secular body of material that ostensibly resists the very idea of universal order.

15. The most compact presentation of Bourdieu's position appears in *Language and Symbolic Power*.

16. The Wittgensteinian term *game* is another name for *field* in Bourdieu's vocabulary (see Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, 172–73).

17. One of Bourdieu's multiple definitions of symbolic capital is "credit founded in credence" (*ibid.*, 192). In the same passage, Bourdieu quotes Benveniste to unpack further the etymological potential of the credit-credence pun, reminding us that *credo* means

literally “to place one’s *kred*,” that is “magic powers,” in a person from whom one expects protection thanks to “believing” in him.

18. Bourdieu states clearly his focus on order and the legitimization of boundaries through ritual naming. In the opening argument of his essay “Rites of Institution,” he claims that his revision of Arnold Van Gennep’s rites of passage is based on the asking of questions “regarding the *social* function of ritual and the social significance of boundaries or limits which the ritual allows one to pass over or transgress in a lawful way” (*Language and Symbolic Power*, 116). Similarly, in “The Social Institution of Symbolic Power,” he tersely remarks that “the act of naming helps to establish *the structure of this world*” (*ibid.*, 105, emphasis added).

19. *Ibid.*, 170.

20. Some of the views expressed here have been influenced by the lectures of Geoffrey Hartman at the 2003 Summer Faculty Seminar, “Religious Hermeneutics and Secular Interpretation,” sponsored by the Erasmus Institute, an intellectual experience that has been particularly stimulating for my own thinking on what I call the production of outstanding texts.

21. For Bourdieu’s concept of the “theory effect,” see *Language and Symbolic Power*, 132–36.

22. I fancy it closest in intention (if not result) to Ginzburg’s *Ecstasies*, to which I have often resorted for inspiration and counsel. One passage from this book’s introduction in particular helped me through many a moment of queasiness: “When considering the long trail of research [this study] involved, I remember experiencing a sensation vaguely resembling vertigo. I naively asked myself whether I would one day have the necessary competence to tackle so vast and complex a theme. Today I know that I never will” (14).

23. The transliteration from Cyrillic follows the system of the Library of Congress without ligatures and diacritical marks. Front *jer* is rendered as (’), and back *jer* as (”). Church Slavonic etymological *u* is consistently transliterated as (ou), regardless of whether the source uses a digraph or not. The transliteration from Greek follows *The Chicago Manual of Style*.

#### CHAPTER ONE

1. The new critical edition of the Greek original is the two-volume *Corpus Dionysiacum*, edited by Beate Regina Suchla, Günter Heil, and Adolf Martin Ritter (1990–1991), and the standard English translation is *Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works*, translated by Colm Luibheid and Paul Rorem (1987). All further references to the corpus will be to these two editions and cited in text and notes (often parenthetically) in the following format: abbreviated title of text, chapter and column number in the Greek edition, separated by a hyphen, and the corresponding page in the English translation, preceded by a slash (e.g., DN 1-596A/55). An excellent introduction to the Dionysian corpus with comprehensive, chapter-by-chapter commentaries on the individual texts is Paul Rorem’s *Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary*.

2. The corpus first gained publicity in the context of the religious disputations in the East that followed the Council at Chalcedon (451). The earliest datable reference to it was

made by the Monophysite Severus, Patriarch of Antioch (512–18), in a treatise against Julian, Bishop of Halicarnassus. The treatise was certainly written before 528, when it was translated into Syriac, but it was made public in 532 at the Constantinople colloquy between the supporters of Chalcedon and their Monophysite (Antiochene) opponents. For details, see Rorem and Lamoreaux, *John of Scythopolis and the Dionysian Corpus*, 10–15.

3. The reputed historian of the Church Eusebius of Caesarea (263–ca. 340) himself identified the Areopagite with the first Bishop of Athens, basing his statement upon the testimony of another Dionysius, the Bishop of Corinth (Eusebius, *History of the Church*, 3.4). The Eastern Orthodox churches celebrate St. Dionysius's martyrdom on October 3. For the standard repertoire of Orthodox hagiographical texts in his honor, see Metropolitan Makarii's *Velikiia minei-chetii: Oktiabr' 1-3*.

4. The man responsible for this tradition is Hilduin, the Abbot of the monastery of Saint-Denis, north of Paris, and the first translator of Dionysius into Latin. About the year 838, when he completed his translation of the corpus, Hilduin wrote a hagiographical account of the *Passio sanctissimi Dionysii* (see Migne, *PL* 106: 23–50). In this text, he identified the Areopagite with the patron of his monastery and thus wove the Dionysian corpus into the tradition of that holy place which, according to the legend, was personally chosen by the martyred Saint-Denis as his resting place (see Louth, *Denys the Areopagite*, 121).

5. The best source on the scholia by John of Scythopolis and their context is the recent exhaustive and highly illuminating study by Paul Rorem and John Lamoreaux, *John of Scythopolis*, which includes an English translation of John's annotations and prologue.

6. The scholia by John and Maximus were intermixed in the tradition, and most surviving versions of the annotated Areopagite are in fact conflation of the two, attributed *en bloc* to Maximus (as in Migne's edition in *PG*, 4). Only recently Beate Regina Suchla identified an early recension of the scholia that contains only those comments authored by John. The results show John's considerable share in the extant commentaries: of the 1,675 individual scholia published by Migne, roughly 600 can be assigned to John. Since the scholia by John are as a rule longer, the total length of his commentaries makes up approximately 70 percent of the total text of the scholia (see details in Rorem and Lamoreaux, *John of Scythopolis*, 36–39).

7. Throughout the Middle Ages, voices of suspicion interrupted the continual panegyric of Dionysius only rarely, and without serious consequence. In the East, an isolated example of such inconsequential skepticism would be the fleeting doubts raised by Patriarch Photius of Constantinople (ca. 810–ca. 895), himself a rather problematic figure (see Rorem, *Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary*, 15).

8. McGinn's revealing comment deserves to be quoted here in full: "From the start [Dionysius's] writings were treated much like the Bible itself—as a divine message filled with inner life and mysterious meaning which could never be exhausted, but which needed to be reread in each generation and reinterpreted in the light of new issues. He himself, however, would probably not have been unhappy with this hermeneutical flexibility, since no one knew better than he the limits of words in the face of the true Mystery" (*Presence of God*, 1:182). Compare Rorem's metaphor of Dionysius's "wax nose" based on the medieval *bon mot* attributed to Alan of Lille, "Authority has a wax nose; it can be bent in diverse directions." Similarly, Rorem contends, the Dionysian writings have been

repeatedly stretched and bent every which way to serve the need of the interpreter (*Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary*, 238–40).

9. What Aquinas famously called Dionysius's "obscure style" (*In librum Beati Dionysii*, 1) is a topos in the responses of virtually everyone who ever attempted to translate the Areopagitical corpus, whether in medieval or modern time. Consider Eriugena's sober assessment, "In his usual way [Dionysius] expresses himself in an *involved and distorted language*, and therefore many find him *extremely obscure and difficult to understand*" (*Periphyseon* 1.50:106, emphasis added). One of the major stumbling blocks in Dionysius's style is his idiosyncratic lexicon. First, he delights in neologisms, some of which were picked up in later philosophical idiom (especially his original term *hierarchy*), but most of them remain to date outright perplexing. Furthermore, his pleonasm operate with an unusually broad range of near-synonyms; to quote Aquinas again, "he often multiplies words, which may seem superfluous, but nevertheless will be found to contain a great depth by those who consider them diligently" (Aquinas, *In librum Beati Dionysii*, 2). Finally, he has a penchant for "hyper-terms" (see McGinn, *Presence of God*, 1:76). These supereminent predications are usually elative adjectival forms (e.g., *hyperagathon*, "more-than-Good," or *hyperagnostos*, "more-than-unknowable") that strive to push language beyond affirmation and negation, and thus beyond its habitual boundaries.

10. See Louth, *Denys the Areopagite*, 111–13. The translation was made by Sergius of Reshaina in Mesopotamia (d. 536) and probably predated the Constantinople colloquy of 532, where the writings of Dionysius are first known to have been cited. Another translation was completed in 708 by Phocas bar Sergius of Edessa. Despite its early appearance in the Syrian context, however, the works of Dionysius never left serious traces there.

11. Having rejected the decisions of the Fourth Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon, the Church of Antioch, the Coptic Church of Egypt, the Armenian, and the Ethiopian Churches (collectively known as non-Chalcedonians) split off from the Pentarchy. The reasons manifested themselves as theological (controversies over the Christological articles of the Creed), but there were underlying political issues as well, mostly a growing resentment of the non-Greek and non-Byzantine Christians toward the idea that the conciliar dogmatic definitions should be imposed as imperial laws by Constantinople.

12. Antioch, the old Syrian capital, was destroyed first by the Persian army of Chosroes in 540, and then, in the famous battle of Jarmuk on August 20 of 636, it was conquered by the Arab army of the Caliph Omar. The new Arab Caliphate chose the Syrian city of Damascus for its capital, thus transforming the region into the cradle of the emerging world of Islam; for a complete historical background, see Cantor, *Civilization of the Middle Ages*, 131–37.

13. That exquisite manuscript, which was the Greek version most widely read by medieval Latin thinkers, is kept today in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris (Gr 437). An indispensable source for studying the Western tradition of the corpus is *Dionysiaca*, the line-by-line edition of the text in the major Latin translations prepared by Philippe Chevallier.

14. About the role of Eriugena, see McGinn, *Presence of God*, 2:80–118. Anastasius the Librarian (well known in medieval Slavic studies as one of the champions of the Slavic apostle St. Constantine-Cyril in Rome) brought out revisions of Eriugena's translation in 875 and added to it clarifying remarks.



15. The revival of interest in Dionysius among the Italian Humanists is related also to the efforts of the Florentine Academy to revive Plato and the Platonic tradition. For the members of the Academy, Dionysius was the quintessential Christian Platonist. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola praised him as the master of the true Christian Kabbalah, and Marsilio Ficino, the head of the Academy, saw Paul, Plato, and Dionysius as the pillars of his own religious synthesis. Ficino even made new translations of *The Divine Names* and *The Mystical Theology* in 1492. For an excellent introduction to the significance of the corpus for the Italian Humanists, see Froehlich, “Pseudo-Dionysius,” 33–46.

16. For a recent, comprehensive (though not always accurate) review of the Dionysian influence among the Slavs, see Denkova, Yaneva, and Ivanova, “Reception of Pseudo-Dionysius in Medieval Bulgaria,” 87–103. See also Stanchev, “Kontseptsiata na Psevdo-Dionisii Areopagit,” and “Dionisii Areopagit”; cf. Ševčenko, “Byzantine Scientific and Pseudo-Scientific Literature,” 328. Especially influential—or so it seems—was a passage from part 4 of *The Divine Names* that was read as a patristic endorsement of translation by sense over translation by form. Since at that early stage of Slavic culture translation was not only the predominant practice but also a critical theoretical issue, the passage, backed by the apostolic authority of Dionysius, soon became a commonplace.

17. For hesychast spirituality and its links to the mysticism of Dionysius, see Meyendorff, *St. Gregory Palamas and Orthodox Spirituality*, esp. 86–88 and 108. For specific aspects of Dionysius’s influence in the fourteenth century, see Keipert, “Velikij Dionisie sice napisa,” 326–50 (cf. Denkova, Yaneva, and Ivanova, “Reception of Pseudo-Dionysius in Medieval Bulgaria,” 100–102). For a useful comparative look at the impact of the Areopagitic corpus on Eastern and Western spirituality in the fourteenth century, see Louth, “Influence of Denys the Areopagite.”

18. A complete edition of Isaiah’s translation appears in Metropolitan Makarii, *Velikii minei-chetii, Oktjabr’ 1–3* (1870): 375–619. For a parallel Greek-Russian edition of *The Divine Names* and *The Mystical Theology*, see Prokhorov, *Dionisii Areopagit*.

19. According to latest count, more than eighty copies of Isaiah’s translation have survived (see Denkova, Yaneva, and Ivanova, “Reception of Pseudo-Dionysius in Medieval Bulgaria,” 97). The oldest among them belongs to a Serbian manuscript from 1579 that is held today in the State Public Library in Moscow, the collection of Gilferding, no. 46. Regarding the manuscript tradition, see Gelian Prokhorov, “Sochinieniia Dionisiia Areopagita,” and *Pamiatniki perevodnoi i russkoi literatury*, 42–59; see also the informative summary by Hermann Goltz, “Traditionsgeschichte des Corpus areopagiticum slavicum.”

20. The first-century authorship of the corpus first came under attack when Desiderius Erasmus (ca. 1466–1536) circulated some brief but disturbing comments that Lorenzo Valla (ca. 1406–57) had made public in 1457. Valla had noticed that no Greek or Latin father before Gregory the Great ever quoted the Areopagite texts, and that parts of the corpus seemed blatantly fictional. Erasmus added to these doubts his own concerns about the much too elaborate liturgical rituals reflected in the corpus, which suggested a later (certainly post-Nicene) date. Martin Luther (1483–1546) adopted Erasmus’s criticism together with his ironic way of referring to the Areopagite, “Dionysius ille quisquis fuerit” (“Dionysius whoever he may be”). Again, Froehlich’s “Pseudo-Dionysius” offers a most succinct and reliable survey on this subject.

21. A large part of Proclus's treatise *On the Existence of Evils* was used in *DN*, and Dionysius drew from other works of his as well, even some written after 462. See Stiglmayr, "Der Neuplatoniker Proclus"; Koch, "Proklus"; and, more recently, Saffrey, "Pseudo-Dionysius and Proclus."

22. Rorem and Lamoreaux (*John of Scythopolis*, 9–11) summarize the arguments for pushing the *terminus a quo* of the corpus into the sixth century. As for the identification of the author, there have been, reportedly, about thirty-two attempts at this point, none of them conclusive. Hathaway provides a helpful summary of the leading hypotheses (*Hierarchy and the Definition of Order*, 31–35). The most recent attempt, proposed independently by Nutsbidze and Honigmann, identifies the anonymous author with the Georgian monk Peter the Iberian (ca. 411–ca. 491); for a more current development of that argument, see Khintibidze, "Novyi argument"; and van Esbroeck, "Peter the Iberian." So uncertain, in fact, is everything about this mysterious author that Paul Rorem semi-playfully questions even the confident gender reference to him (or her?); see his foreword to *Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary*, 1.

23. The Protestant Georg Calixt (1586–1656) is credited with having used the designation "Dionysius Pseudo-Areopagita" first in 1619. I generally avoid it because it appears to me not only clumsy but also slightly derogatory (cf. similar thoughts in Rorem, *Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary*, 3). About apophatic Christian thought and the place of Dionysius in it, see, for example, volume 2 of Raoul Mortley's panoramic study *From Word to Silence*.

24. See Rorem and Lamoreaux, *John of Scythopolis*, 4–5.

25. This last metaphor, a paraphrase of the biblical command of Yahweh to the Israelites to plunder the Egyptians in order to enrich themselves (Exod. 3:22; 12:35–36) was suggested to me by Jeauneau, "Neoplatonic Themes," 6. On the *spolatio* motif and Exod. 3:21–22, 11:2–3, and 12:35–37 as a paradigm for Christian appropriation of wisdom from the pagan world, see Frizzell, "Spoils from Egypt."

26. Luther, "Babylonian Captivity," (1520), in *Martin Luthers Werke* 6:562.

27. Cf. Louth, *Denys the Areopagite*, 11.

28. The symbolic weight of Dionysius's gesture can be adequately evaluated only against a broader historical backdrop. As is well known, the sixth century marked the peak of the growing tension in the Byzantine Empire between the token site of the old pagan Greek culture and its new Christian counterpart, Athens and Constantinople. Many saw the Neoplatonic School in Athens, where Proclus had reigned for much of the fifth century as its last great figure (and which at the time of Dionysius was still a living center of classical education and thought), as the stronghold of the old tradition, a direct heir of Plato's Academy, and often referred to it by the same name. It is easy to imagine, then, how Proclean Neoplatonism emerged at the time as an ideological rival of Christianity, especially if we keep in mind that Platonism "was not only a school of philosophy, but a school of spirituality" (see Jeauneau, "Neoplatonic Themes," 4). The conflict culminated in 529 with the edict of Emperor Justinian to close the Academy, which—had Dionysius never written his works—might have been the death of Neoplatonism.

29. For a more inclusive approach to the question of synthesis in Dionysius, see, for example, David Tracy, "Divided Consciousness of Augustine," who presents

the Areopagitical corpus as the most successful Christian synthesis of Eros and Logos. One may even argue that the Areopagitical corpus externalizes, perhaps for the first time so dramatically, a tendency in Eastern Orthodoxy to favor synthesis over analysis, a tendency that is often seen (at least from an Eastern standpoint) as marking an important divide between the Christian East and West. To be sure, the capacity for synthesis is the one quality most frequently brought up by Eastern theologians to characterize both the Orthodox theological vision and Orthodox sacramental experience in opposition to their Western counterparts. Meyendorff, for example, claims that the Eastern Orthodox experience emphasizes *antinomies* and thus preserves “a sense of inadequacy between the formulae and the content of the faith” in opposition to the Western emphasis on “conceptual rationalism” and analytical formulae (*Byzantine Theology*, 124; cf. the more general scheme of synthesis/antithesis proposed by Fedotov in *Russian Religious Mind*, esp. 23–57).

30. When the so-called Monophysites brought up the Dionysian writings at the Constantinople colloquy of 532, the spokesman for their opponents, Hypatius, the Bishop of Ephesus, challenged the alleged apostolic authority of the author by pointing out that none of his works had ever been cited, or even mentioned, before. Thus the first reaction to the “discovery” of the corpus on the part of the Chalcedonians was reserved at best (see Rorem and Lamoreaux, *John of Scythopolis*, 15–18). I should note that the term “Monophysite” is not accepted by the Oriental Orthodox Churches to which it is applied.

31. An early Greek copy of the corpus (which Beate Regina Suchla dates from the first half of the sixth century and which she claims to be the antigraph for all later Greek manuscripts) already incorporated John of Scythopolis’s *Scholia* and *Prologue* in the form of interlinear and marginal commentaries (see Suchla, “Eine Redaktion”). For further evidence of such Talmudic-style practice, consider the following: “In 875 Anastasius Bibliothecarius informed Charles the Bald that in Constantinople he had recently received a copy of the *Scholia* on the works of Dionysius. This is a text he translated and added to the margins of Eriugina’s Latin version of the works of Dionysius” (Rorem and Lamoreaux, *John of Scythopolis*, 3 and 36, n. 56; emphasis added).

32. I have borrowed the phrase “limitrophic violence” from Derrida, though in the process—as is always the danger when quoting out of context—I may have reinvented it beyond recognition (see Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, xxv).

33. See Rorem and Lamoreaux, *John of Scythopolis*, 3.

## CHAPTER TWO

1. On Judaism as a religion of the name, consult the fundamental works of Gershom Scholem, “The Name of God,” and *On the Kabbalah*, especially 36–44; see also Peter Schäfer, *The Hidden and Manifest God*; and Joseph Dan, “The Name of God.” David Burrell offers a noteworthy comparative analysis of Judaic, Muslim, and Christian onomastological views in “Naming the Names of God,” and a good, comprehensive review of divine names across world religions appears in the entry “Names” in Jean Chevalier and Alain Gheerbrant’s *A Dictionary of Symbols*, 693–95.

2. During the time of the Second Temple, the high priest alone was allowed to pronounce the ineffable name on Yom Kippur (the Day of Atonement), while reciting Lev. 16:30 during the confessional, and the people in the forecourt would prostrate themselves,

praying that he not be struck down for unworthiness (see Cohon, “The Name of God,” 591).

3. The scriptural source of this Christian topos is the baptismal formula introduced in Matt. 28:19 (“baptizing. . . in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit”). Friedrich Giesebrecht discusses the Hebrew origin and the initial ritual meaning of the formula “in the name of [God]” (*Die Alttestamentliche Schätzung des Gottesnamens*, 134–40). Walter Bauer, who mentions the rabbinical model of the accusative (directional) Greek construction *eis (to) onoma (theou)*, points out that it is used in New Testament Greek and in early patristic writings with the meaning of both “with regard to” and “while calling on the name of.” He further asserts that the concept of dedication is crucial for the correct interpretation of the baptismal formula: “Through baptism *eis to onoma theou* the one who is baptized becomes the possession of and comes under the protection of the one whose name he bears” (*Greek-English Lexicon*, 572). The formula “in the name of” is present in all modern European languages, although today it is greatly trivialized, and the original meaning of “name” in it is largely lost. For further information on scriptural name-formulas, see Sergei Bulgakov, who provides an extensive list of biblical references to the name of God (*Filosofia imeni*, 257–61).

4. The Jewish exegetes point out that the root for “wonderful” is the same one used to construct “name-for-the-name.” Hence the rebuke is interpreted as a statement about the utmost secrecy and power of the name withheld (see Janowitz, “Theories of Divine Names,” 366).

5. It is important to underline the relation of this passage to the most sacred name of God in the Jewish tradition, YHWH, which the Greeks called “the Tetragrammaton” (literally, “four letters”). The traditional pronunciation of this name is “Yahweh,” the second syllable of which, “eh,” is based on the assonance *ehyeh* (“I am”). The name was considered so immensely powerful and sacred that after the third century BCE it became practically a taboo, and the name *adonai* (“the Lord”) was used instead. Christian exegesis relates the name YHWH to the statement “God is love” (John 4:8–16) by way of Exod. 34:6–7, the Lord’s proclamation of his love and mercy which the rabbis call “the Thirteen Attributes” and which comes in response to Moses’s request to see the glory of God (Exod. 33:18). See Martin Rose, *Jahwe*, for a comprehensive study on the subject.

6. Ricoeur, *Essays*, 94.

7. Note that this single, positive statement of God about his name documented in Scripture is given in the form of an I-identification (“I am X”). This circumstance opens the possibility of considering the abundance of other such identity statements of God from across the Old and the New Testaments as self-naming acts and their nominal predicates as the Lord’s names: “I am the first and the last” (Isa. 44:6, 48:6; Rev. 1:17); “I am the bread of life” (John 6:35, 6:48); “I am the light of the world” (John 8:12); “I am the good shepherd” (John 10:11); “I am the Son of God” (John 10:36); “I am the resurrection and the life” (John 11:25); “I am the way, and the truth, and the life” (John 14:16); “I am the true vine” (John 15:1); “I am the Alpha and the Omega, the Beginning and the End” (Rev. 1:8).

8. Many scholars consider *ehyeh* to be the Hiphil form of the verb “to be” and thus construe a causative meaning, which would cohere with the phrase “Yahweh Sabaoth,” read as “the One who creates the heavenly Sabaoth.” Such an interpretation suggests an *a fortiori* argument: if Yahweh creates the Sabaoth, the heavenly beings, how much

more is he to be regarded as creating the earthly world that we inhabit. The verb can also be construed as an imperfect form referring to the future: “I will be who I will be.” The phrase, in turn, can be taken in the sense of reassuring presence—“I will be with you”—thus harmonizing with the context in Exodus, where God promises to be with Moses and the Hebrews on their journey to freedom.

9. Among the numerous contemporary studies on the subject, the most comprehensive are Taylor’s *Names of Jesus*, Cullmann’s *Christology*, Sabourin’s *Names and Titles of Jesus*, and Hahn’s *Titles of Jesus*.

10. Islam shares in the same dialectics. Based on the Koran (7:179), the Islamic tradition contends that Allah has ninety-nine Most Beautiful names (these legitimate appellations of the revealed God are discussed in detail by Al-Ghazzali [see Burrell and Daher, *Al-Ghazzali*]). At the same time, it claims that Allah has only one Great Name (*al-ismu’l-a’zam*), the hundredth and most secret one, which alone represents his concealed essence.

11. See Bulgakov, *Filosofia imeni*, 190 and 206. Gregory of Nyssa offers a similar proposition when discussing the baptismal formula: “What then does that unnamable name mean, about which the Lord said ‘Baptizing them into the name’ without adding the significant word which ‘the name’ indicates? . . . For how could a name be found for that which is above every name? But he gave the power that *whatever* name our intelligence by holy endeavor should discover, indicative of the transcendent nature, that that name should be equally applicable to the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, whether the ‘good’ or the ‘incorruptible,’ . . . *whatever* name each may think worthy to be employed to indicate the undefiled nature” (Migne, *PG*, 45: 14–15, *Contra Eunomium*). I quote here the English translation of the passage provided in Mortley, *From Word to Silence*, 2:181 (emphasis added).

12. See Samuel Cohon’s telling remarks about the indispensability of the notion of God’s name for the establishment of the advanced Jewish monotheistic idea of God as a *personality*: “While personality is conceivable in nameless being, it is greatly crystallized by a name” (“The Name of God,” 582).

13. A related issue, which would come to the fore with the transformation of Christianity into an imperial religion at the time of Justinian, is the question of the Bible. The Bible (both the source of Christian doctrine and a key element of Christian worship) was created in particular languages: Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek. That circumstance proved to be at odds with the universalism of Christianity and its missionary character. It confronted Christian proselytizing with two equally imperfect alternatives: colonial bilingualism (a split between everyday and ritual language) or translation of the sacred texts (creation of multiple ritual languages across the Christian world). Each alternative implied a potential obstacle: the first of not being understood; the second of corrupting the Holy Writ.

14. Tracy, “Divided Consciousness of Augustine,” 95.

15. See Hadot’s compelling argument in *What Is Ancient Philosophy?* 237–52.

16. “Discourse” is the standard English translation today for the Greek term *logos*.

17. See Lossky, *In the Image*, 13. On the Neoplatonic negative method (*via negativa*) in its historical contexts, see Mortley, *From Word to Silence*, 1:125–58.

18. Concerning the Hebrew word *shem* (name) and its implications of a substantial relationship between the name and the name-bearer, see, for example, Giesebrecht, *Die Alttestamentliche Schätzung des Gottesnamens*, 7–21. See also Trachtenberg, who

presents insightful quotations from Hebrew texts on the matter such as “the man’s name is his person,” or “the man’s name is his soul” (*Jewish Magic*, 78). It is interesting to note, however, that by the very act of the Septuagint translation (283–246 BCE), which consistently rendered the Hebrew *shem* by the Greek *onoma*, the entire spectrum of ambiguities of the Greek term, including those concerning the origin of names, was invested into the particular version of the Jewish Bible that later became the Christian Old Testament.

19. See Aristotle, *On Interpretation* 16a, 29, in *The Categories [and] On Interpretation*.

20. The works of Eunomius are extant only in fragments included in a series of polemical treatises against him (*Contra Eunomium*) written by Basil the Great (Migne, *PG*, 29–30) and Gregory of Nyssa (Migne, *PG*, 45).

21. Origen, *Contra Celsum*, bk. 5, sec. 45, p. 299.

22. See similar ideas in Janowitz’s “Theories of Divine Names,” where the author, at her own discretion, interprets Origen’s theory of names in the terms of Peircian semiotics. Compare Bulgakov’s idea that the divine name is a “verbal icon” (*slovesnaia ikona*; see his *Filosofia imeni*, 186).

23. Regarding their translatability, Origen wrote, “If the names whose nature it is to be powerful in some particular language are translated into another language, they no longer have any effect as they did with their proper sounds” (*Contra Celsum*, bk. 5, sec. 45).

24. See Mortley, *From Word to Silence*, 2:223.

25. Despite the resistance it encountered, the cratylic idea continued to linger on the fringes of Christian intellectual life, never fully embraced as legitimate yet never really banished. The most recent proof of its vitality and potential to turn the tide in its own favor was the renewed controversy on Mount Athos that exploded early in the twentieth century when the Russian monk Hilarion proposed the provocative formula “The Name of God is as if God Himself” (*Imia Bozhe kak by sam Bog*). This startling pronouncement triggered waves of protest and resentment among the monks of Mount Athos, polarizing them into supporters of Hilarion, who called themselves *imiaslavtsy* (Russian: “those who glorify the Name” or “onomatolaters”), and his opponents, significantly named *imiabortsy* (“name-breakers” or “onomatoclasts”), with a clear reference to the Iconoclast controversy that had shaken the Eastern Orthodox world twelve centuries before. Though the name-breakers instigated the conflict and were initially much more vocal, Hilarion’s camp eventually gained the support of broader religious circles both on Mount Athos and in Russia. In fact, their position became so strong that they might even have won the battle, repeating the triumph of the Iconodules (those who venerate icons) in 843, had not the October Revolution “resolved” the matter (among so many others) in its own radical way. For an informative account of this controversy and its influence on Russian religious thought, see N. K. Bonetskaia, “O filologicheskoi shkole P. A. Florenskogo.” The best study of the controversy to date is the two-volume tour de force by Bishop Ilarion Alfeev, *Sviashchennaia taina Tserkv*.

26. See Gregory Nazianzen, *Hymn to God*, in Migne, *PG*, 37: 507.

27. Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, 1:14.

28. See Mortley, *From Word to Silence*, 2:251.

## CHAPTER THREE

1. See Lossky, *In the Image and Likeness*, 17.

2. Only two previous nonpolemical works discuss divine names, although neither focuses exclusively on this subject: Origen's *Peri Archon* (On the first principle) is a systematic statement of Christian faith, providing the basis for allegorical interpretation of the Bible; and Augustine's *De Trinitate* (On the Trinity), which discusses the proper naming of God in books 5–7 and seeks to clarify how ecclesiastical teaching can be understood in the light of previous Trinitarian controversies and their dogmatic resolution.

3. See Ep. 6–7, where Dionysius dismisses polemical theology as “superfluous” and, largely, a waste of energy. Note especially the following unqualified statement: “I have never wished to embark on controversies with Greeks or with any others. It is enough for me to know about the truth and then to speak appropriately of what I know. And may God grant me this!” (Ep.7-1080A/267).

4. Note that Dionysius characteristically articulates this common denominator of creation in the Johannine language of “yearning” and “love” (see esp. DN 4-709B–D/81). In the same line of thought, consider Andrew Louth's metaphoric definition of Dionysius's hierarchy as “not a ladder we struggle up by our own effort,” but “the outreach of God's love” (*Denys the Areopagite*, 41).

5. I use the term “quality space” to refer to the topographic model of social relations that Fernandez proposes in *Persuasion and Performance*.

6. It is important to emphasize here the rich Christian implications of “gift” (*dōrea*). It is used in New Testament Greek exclusively as designating the gifts of God in opposition to the term for human gift, *dōron*, with its distinct connotations of contingency and deprivation. Furthermore, this Christian term encompasses a vast semantic field that includes not only that which is given, but also the act of sharing a particular perfection (attribute), the gratuitous stance involved in the bounteous act, and even the particular capacity bestowed upon the receiver, a peculiar “partaking” in the gift so benevolently shared by God with the creation. See, for example, the usage of “the gift (*dōrea*) of righteousness” by St. Paul: “If, because of the one man's trespass, death exercised dominion through that one, much more surely will those who receive the abundance of grace and the free gift of righteousness exercise dominion in life through the one man, Jesus Christ” (Rom. 5:17). About the anthropological concept of “gift circle” as a community sustained by a perpetual circulation of gifts, see Hyde, *The Gift*, 56–92. Needless to say, the classic study by Mauss, *The Gift*, is still indispensable for any social theory of gifts.

7. Dionysius first introduces the term *kenosis* in a reference to its original apostolic context (Phil. 2:7) and in accordance with its traditional Christological application. Yet in a crucial passage that follows almost immediately and recapitulates the entire differentiation/unity argument, Dionysius applies the same term to the entire Godhead, which “remains . . . full amid the emptying act of differentiation” (DN 2-649B/66). This expansion of the term is consistent with the general premise of the treatise that whatever term is applied to one of the divine hypostases refers to the entire divinity.

8. Dionysius compares the divine gifts to a seal that gives itself completely to each impression yet leaves differing impressions, because the substances receiving a share of the archetype differ in their receptivity (DN 2-644A–B/62–63).

9. McGinn, *Presence of God*, 1:174.

10. “In the divine realm unities hold a higher place than differentiation” (*DN* 2-652A/67).

11. Note that both “beyond” and “supra” (as preposition or as prefix) translate the Greek *hyper*; hence the standard reference to such words as “hyper-terms” (see McGinn, *Presence of God*, 1:176).

12. Lossky, *In the Image and Likeness*, 29. In a related passage that explicates the understanding of the Trinitarian relationship in Dionysius, Lossky elaborates, “Denied in their opposition, the two terms [Unity and Trinity] must be understood together, in a sort of synopsis or simultaneous vision which identifies by distinguishing” (27).

13. *Ibid.*, 29.

14. *Ibid.*, 13.

15. Dionysius is often seen as too heavily order-bound, an inhabitant of a rigid hierarchical universe of his own making. Andrew Louth’s defense of Dionysius against such charges is by itself revealing of this prejudice: “For many the very notion of order and hierarchy seems constraining: people are allotted their role and are to be content within it. In favor of the notion of hierarchy it could be argued that the alternative to some order is no order, and that anarchy brings with it much greater evils, much greater constraints on freedom and fulfillment. But [Dionysius] himself has none of these doubts or questions. He is deeply committed to the notion of an ordered society” (*Denys the Areopagite*, 42). I believe that such a line of defense, however well-intended, does little justice to the remarkably holistic notion of order advanced in the Areopagitical corpus, mostly because it operates within the binary logic that the author of *The Mystical Theology* so elegantly transcends.

16. For revealing commentaries on the structure of the corpus, see Lossky, *In the Image and Likeness*, 25–26, and esp. Rorem, “The Place of *The Mystical Theology* in the Pseudo-Dionysian Corpus,” 87–98, which discusses alternative opinions on the interrelation of the treatises.

17. The description of creation in terms of gradual “overflowing” is one of the most controversial points of this treatise and may be interpreted as verging on pantheism. Dionysius, however, is particularly careful in his attempts to protect himself from such charges. In the same chapter he includes an elaborate qualification about the discontinuity between God and the created things, emphasizing that “there is no exact likeness between caused and cause, for the caused carry within themselves only such images of their originating sources as are possible for them, whereas the causes themselves are located in a realm transcending the caused, according to the argument regarding their source” (*DN*2-645C/64). For more details, see Rorem, *Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary*, 168 and 176–77.

18. Rorem specifies that Pseudo-Dionysius consistently uses the word *theology* in its literal meaning as “the word of God” (i.e., “the Bible”), and the word *theologians*, used interchangeably with “God’s wise men,” designates unequivocally the Scripture writers (“Biblical Allusions,” 63–64).

19. Rorem (*ibid.*, 64) points out that this short passage includes 108 references to the Bible and, in the entire work of Pseudo-Dionysius, is the passage most densely saturated with scriptural quotations and allusions.



20. The main thesis of chapter 2 of *The Divine Names* is that all names attributed to one person of the Trinity—with the exception of the Trinitarian titles proper—must be taken to belong, without distinction, to the entire divinity (DN 2-637A/58, 637C/60, 640B/60, 652A/67). This thesis follows directly from the general principle of personal non-opposition within the Trinity, as discussed above.

21. On *theosis* (deification or divinization) and its strategic place in Eastern Orthodox thought, see Ware [Bishop Kallistos of Diokletia], *Orthodox Church*, 231–38. For an excellent introduction to the interrelatedness of deification and the knowledge of God (with a weighty share of attention to the works of Dionysius), see Lossky, *In the Image and Likeness*.

22. See Ep. 9-1104B–1109A/280–285; the other references to *The Symbolic Theology* include the following passages: DN 1-597B/57; DN 4-700C/75; DN 9-913B/117; DN 13-984A/131; CH 15-336A/187; and, most notably, MT 3-1033B–C/139.

23. The Bible explicitly testifies to the existence of the gifts prior to Creation. See, for example, Prov. 8:23–31, where Wisdom claims she was established from eternity before the Creation, or the opening pericope of the Gospel of St. John, where it is asserted that the Word was “in the beginning” “with God” and that “the Word was God” (John 1:1).

24. Fernandez, *Persuasion and Performance*, 13ff.

25. “Insofar that it is evil,” Dionysius claims, “it neither is nor confers being” (DN 4-717C/86); “[it] cannot produce and cannot sustain anything, cannot make or preserve anything” (DN 4-729B/93), it “has no being nor does it inhere in the things that have being” (DN 4-733C/95). It does not have an ontological status and, in a manner of speaking, it does not exist, for it does not exist in and by itself but only as a function of Good. Evil is only “imperfect Goodness” (DN 4-721A/88), “a falling-short of goodness” (DN 4-725A/90), “a deficiency and a lack of the perfection of the inherent goodness” (DN 4-728A/92).

26. Dionysius specifically instructs his readers on this point: “Do not make a distinction between ‘beautiful’ and ‘beauty’ as applied to the Cause which gathers all into one. For we recognize the difference in intelligible beings between qualities that are shared and the objects which share them. We call ‘beautiful’ that which has a share in beauty, and we give the name of ‘beauty’ to that ingredient which is the cause of beauty in everything. But the ‘beautiful’ which is beyond individual being is called ‘beauty’ because of that beauty bestowed by it on all things, each in accordance with what it is” (DN 4-701C–704A/76–77).

27. This ontological dichotomy of names also has a grammatical consequence that, although left untouched by Dionysius, is still instructive for a philological systematization. Since the level of abstraction decreases with the “procession” from conceptual to physical reality, symbolic names, grounded in the realm of the senses, are related to the grammatical category of concreteness, contrary to the inherent abstractness of the conceptual names. Thus symbolic names are articulated mainly in concrete nouns or noun-groups, whereas conceptual names have the form of abstract nouns or qualifying adjectives.

28. Eric Perl provides the following revealing elaboration of Dionysius’s concepts of hierarchy and participation: “When Dionysius says that the higher ranks of creation are ‘closer’ to God than the lower, therefore, this must not be taken to mean that they stand between God and the lower orders. It means rather that they participate in God in more and greater ways. . . . The higher levels are not exempt from, but rather include in an

eminent way, the perfections of the lower in their own, and the lower do not lack but rather manifest in a lesser way the perfections of the higher" ("Hierarchy and Participation," 20–21).

29. Note that Dionysius makes a subtle differentiation between the perceptible symbolism of "Light-Sun" that is to be dealt with in *The Symbolic Theology* and the "conceptual content of the term 'light' as applied to the Good," namely, the concept of spiritual illumination (DN 4-700C–701A/75).

30. Dionysius discusses similar and dissimilar symbols at length in chapter 2 of *The Celestial Hierarchy*. Note, however, that, in his characteristic manner, he does not see the two groups as forming a binary opposition; instead, the corpus as a whole advances the idea that any image applied to God is simultaneously similar and dissimilar to him: "They are similar to him to the extent that they share what cannot be shared. They are dissimilar to him in that as effects they fall so very far short of their Cause and are infinitely and incomparably subordinate to him" (DN 9-916A/118; cf. René Roques, "Preface").

31. In the Hebrew *Aqedah* narrative, Isaac, the "sacrificial lamb" (Gen. 22:7–8) is miraculously and mercifully replaced by a ram at the moment of sacrifice. According to the traditional Christian reading of Gen. 22:1–19, which construes Isaac as prefiguring the Christ, the passage anticipates the New Testament title of Jesus "the Lamb of God" (John 1:29). Such a reading is reinforced by Isaiah's prophecy envisioning the suffering Messiah as "a lamb that is led to the slaughter" (Isa. 53:7).

32. For a definition of the term "grand narrative," see Lyotard, *Postmodern Condition*, xxiii.

33. Lossky, *In the Image and Likeness*, 14.

34. DN 1-592B. Here I prefer a more literal translation of the Dionysian paradoxical paragon to the one given by Luibheit and Rorem in the Paulist edition (*Pseudo-Dionysius*, 52—"with shape and form on things which have neither").

35. Lossky, *In the Image and Likeness*, 14–15.

#### CHAPTER FOUR

1. Foucault's claim that order exists in the tension between "the already 'encoded' eye and reflexive knowledge," that the experience of order is the middle ground where social practices and social theories of order could inform one another, is particularly important to my overarching concern with order (see Foucault, *Order of Things*, xx–xxi). No less enlightening is Bourdieu's insight that we can grasp the logic of practice only through theoretical constructs that expose its inner relative coherence by exaggerating it. This means that theoretical models have a heuristic value for discerning within "fuzzy" practices a logic that remains otherwise hidden (see Bourdieu, *Logic of Practice*, 11–15).

2. For Dionysius's emphasis on meaning, see a characteristic critique of formalist exegesis in his apology for using *eros* ("yearning") and *agape* ("love") interchangeably: "In my opinion, it would be unreasonable and silly to look at words rather than at the power of their meanings. Anyone seeking to understand the divine things should never do this, for this is the procedure followed by those who do not allow empty sounds to pass beyond their ears. . . . People like this are concerned with meaningless letters and lines, with syllables and phrases which they do not understand" (DN 4-708B–C/80).

3. For the Neoplatonic philosophy of numbers, see, for example, Schrenk, “God as Monad,” 5. “Everything has been organized by the monad,” reads the highly instructive anonymous text of *The Theology of Arithmetic* found in a corpus of works by the Neoplatonist Iamblichus (third or fourth century), “because it contains everything potentially: for even if they are not yet actual, nevertheless the monad holds seminally the principles which are all within numbers” (35). The anonymous author proceeds further to list various mathematical peculiarities of the number one, which “produces itself and is produced from itself”; it is both even and odd, linear and plane and solid, perfect and defective, proportional and harmonic, prime and secondary, diagonal and side (35–37). The discovery of these paradoxical qualities paves the way to a particular philosophy of mathematics centered on the monad, a mathematical monotheism of sorts. It opens up a transparent analogy between the cosmogonic potentials of the number one, the universal factor of all the integers, and the one and only God, who is “all in all” (1 Cor. 15:28), “all things through the transcendence of one unity,” and “the cause of all without ever departing from that oneness” (DN 13-977C/128).

4. Note that *MT* follows *DN* in the structure of the corpus as presented in the extant manuscript tradition. In the “ideal” (or perhaps better said, “fictitious”) structure of the corpus, *DN* was supposed to be followed by *The Symbolic Theology* (see Dionysius, *Pseudo-Dionysius*, 131, n. 269).

5. The Old Testament canon was closed by the second century AD with the deutero-canonical books of the Septuagint tradition. The New Testament canon was settled in local councils during the fourth century.

6. Foucault, *Order of Things*, 118.

7. Listmaking, broadly conceived, is not limited to the domain of the verbal. We can argue that serial representations of visual or plastic images (e.g., the medallions with portraits of all the popes inside the basilica San Paolo fuori la mura in Rome, or Peter Greenaway’s pictorial “translations” of Sei Shonagon’s lists in his film *The Pillow Book*) are indeed visual lists. In view of my general focus on rhetoric, however, I restrict my discussion of lists to the verbal variety.

8. The phrase belongs to Mark Morris’s study of Sei’s lists in *The Pillow Book*. The entire passage is particularly relevant to our discussion: “The metonymic serialization inevitably sets up a playful metaphorical bond between individual entries; *they become somehow alike in fitting to the [same] heading*. For the simple crime of contingency, they all receive (or rather, complete) the same sentence. Just as we enjoy moving through and second-guessing a collocation of things ridiculed by people or terribly incongruous things, so we appreciate the concocting of a world where scared dogs and singing girls, or Persians and sick doctors and dumb teachers turn out to be, temporarily at least, bedfellows” (Morris, “Poetic Catalogues,” 43, emphasis added; cf. similar ideas in Spufford, *Cabbages and Kings*, 3).

9. The term that articulates that “thing in common” among the list members—their common denominator, if you will—is the subject of the list, or, as Stephen Barney calls it, its *principle*. “A list without a principle,” he declares, “would seem bewildering if not pointless—we need to know what is being listed” (“Chaucer’s Lists,” 191). We may be aware of this principle only by implication, or the list may, as it often does, spell it out in an opening or concluding formula, but either way lists are always “lists of”: a list of the

students in a class, *of things to do, of books to read, of favored hates or hated lovers*. I owe this observation to William Gass, *Habitations of the World*, 177.

10. Since lists do not explain or even externalize, let alone justify, the order they represent, they need a hermeneut to do it for them. I owe this insight to J. Z. Smith, who proposes two more terms that attest to the list's varying capacity for representing order: a catalogue is an ordered list; a canon, a closed catalogue. Smith argues that any canon needs a hermeneut to provide its fixity with the flexibility it needs in order to survive, an argument that fits perfectly the hermeneutical practice that Dionysius ascribes to Christian theologians of the Name. For the complete argument, see Smith, *Imagining Religion*, 36–52, esp. 44–49.

11. "The elements of a list are plural (*polla*) as they are 'happenings' (*gignomena*) and 'visibles' (*horatai*)," wrote Stephen Barney, one of the finest theorizers of lists ("Chaucer's Lists," 201). His study, though historically specific, is brimming with general insights about lists, and particularly about lists of "copious display."

12. Francis Spufford, to whom we owe the first anthology of literary lists—an illuminating and a highly entertaining list project—claims that "museums are frozen lists" (*Cabbages and Kings*, 3). More generally, on the coextensiveness of museums and catalogues (the "intellectually glorified lists"), see Robert Harbison, especially the chapter "Contracted World: Museums and Catalogues" (*Eccentric Spaces*, 140–62).

13. The Russian theologian Bishop Ilarion Alfeev offers a similar evaluation of Dionysius in his recent comprehensive study of the worship of divine names in Eastern Orthodoxy: the teachings of the Areopagite fit perfectly the liturgical practice of the Church, just as the liturgical practice is fully concordant with his teachings (*Sviashchennaia taina Tserkvi*, 166). Significantly, his prime illustration of this claim is the persistent enumeration of divine names across the liturgical genres.

14. See Foucault's more general hypothesis that classical Western *episteme* (which he stretches up to the sixteenth century) is by nature cumulative, monotonous addition being the only possible form of connecting its individual elements (see *Order of Things*, 30–32).

15. Von Soden's authorship of the *Listenwissenschaft* idea has been contested by Benno Landsberger, who claims that the idea was only "elaborated by W. von Soden" (quoted in Goody, *Savage Mind*, 165, n. 7). Jonathan Z. Smith attributes the term to Albert Alt, referring to Alt's "Die Weisheit Salamos," an article that was published fifteen years after von Soden's work (see Smith, *Imagining Religion*, 47).

16. Von Soden, "Leistung und Grenze," 113 (my translation).

17. The list-structure of the "scientific" project of Near Eastern Antiquity, however, survived intact in Jewish religious culture, yielding a rich tradition of listmaking practices. For analyses of biblical lists see, for example, Gerhard von Rad, "Job"; Hartmut Gese, "Idea of History,"; John G. Gammie, "Book of Daniel,"; and Peter W. Coxon, "The 'List' Genre." See also Wayne Towner's extensive analysis of rabbinic numerical lists in *Rabbinic "Enumeration of Scriptural Examples"*; and Jacob Neusner's insightful remarks on the use of lists in the classical rabbinic sources (*Transformation of Judaism*, 5, 113, and especially 173–91).

18. Antonomasia, the figure of repeated re-naming, derives its name from Greek *antonomazo*, "to name instead."

19. Cardinal Jean Batiste Pitra provides a handful of examples in volumes 2 and 3 of his monumental *Spicilegium* (2:137–38 and 143–45; 3:447–48). His selection includes a Greek list of 92 names (3:447–48), a bilingual Greco-Latin list of 144 appellations (2:143–45), and a Latin list of 100 names (2:145–47), among others.

20. The compiler has transcribed erroneously the *textus receptus* (Apoc. 1:[17–]18), which reads “I am the first and the last, I am the Living One; and I was dead.” I owe the correction of the translation to Moshe Taube (Jerusalem).

21. The complete Greek text was published by Franz Diekamp in 1907 (*Doctrina Patrum*) and is almost identical to the text published by Jean Baptiste Pitra (*Spicilegium*, 2:137–38), who attributes it to Anastasius Monachus. An English translation of the catalogue alone was made available by Leopold Sabourin (*Names and Titles of Jesus*, 315–17).

22. The *Symeonic Florilegium* (whose earliest extant copy, the so-called *Sviatoslav Florilegium*, dates from 1073), is one rich source of such catalogues (see Pavlova, Raleva, and Doseva, eds., *Simeonov sbornik*). The codex contains “Names of the Prophets,” fols. 254r–254v; “Names of the Apostles,” fols. 262r–263v; a list of the (12) precious stones that appear on the high priest’s breastplate (Exod. 28:17–21), fols. 152v–154r; the “Names of the (12) Great Mountains”; and the “Names of the (36) Great Rivers.” The last two lists are included in the table of contents of the *Sviatoslav Florilegium*, but are missing in the body of the text and are extant only in much later copies (see Mikhaila, “Spiski Sbornika,” 12).

23. Migne’s edition of the treatise provides several versions of the list, including a trilingual Hebrew-Latin-Greek version (*PL*, 23:1329–40).

24. For a later, ninth-century extrapolation that provides the trilingual list alone under the title *The Names of Christ*, see Pitra, *Spicilegium*, 3:448.

25. See Boissande, *ANEKDOTA*, 460; cf. Pitra, *Spicilegium*, 3:447.

26. See Thorndike, *History of Magic*, 2:407.

27. It appears, for example, in the notorious seventeenth-century *Grimoire of Honorius* (see Waite, *Ceremonial Magic*, 281). This magic list of Hebrew terms bears a family resemblance to the Jewish mystical text of the same name, mostly known from Kabbalistic sources, where the names correspond to the ten *sefirot*, or emanations of the divinity (see Budge, *Amulets and Magic*, 370–73). For a good introduction into the Kabbalistic notion of the *sefirot*, see Idel, *Kabbalah*, 112–55.

28. The earliest Slavonic copy of the text is found in a miscellany from the end of the thirteenth century known as the *Berlin Codex*; see chapter 8 for details about the Slavonic tradition.

29. One of the most prominent thinkers of the Russian religious renaissance at the beginning of the twentieth century, Pavel Florenskii, has claimed that the entire format of Christian worship is a profession (*propoved'*) and a confession (*ispoved'*) of the Lord’s Name (see Florenskii, “Imiaslavie kak filosofskaia predposylka,” esp. 330).

30. Despite the efforts of the first four ecumenical councils, and especially the Council of Chalcedon (451), to complete the dogmatic foundation of the Christian Churches, some crucial issues remained unresolved in the East at least until the ninth century. We cannot posit a definitive conclusion of these debates before 787, when the Iconodules triumphed over the Iconoclasts at the seventh Ecumenical Council (Nicaea).

31. In his authoritative survey of Byzantine theology, Meyendorff singles out the sixth century as the time when the Orthodox liturgy was constituted in its elaborate form of ritual performance (*Byzantine Theology*, 29ff.). The first half of the sixth century also saw the inauguration of the most imposing Orthodox cathedral, Hagia Sophia, in Constantinople, which not only defined the liturgical practices of Eastern Orthodox Christianity for centuries, but was seen as incorporating the very idea of Orthodoxy. After five years of construction, the cathedral was inaugurated in 537 under Emperor Justinian.

32. *Akathistos* (lit. “not seated”) designates that people should stand while the hymn is sung, and *Theotokos* (lit. “Mother of God,” or “God-bearer”) is the principal Orthodox title for Mary, which was attributed to her by the third Ecumenical Council (Ephesus, 431). The hymn was initially assigned for the Vigil of the Annunciation (March 25). In contemporary liturgical practice, its complete presentation has been shifted to the Vigil of the Fifth Saturday of Lent, called “the Sabbath of the Akathistos Hymn.” The most popular hypothesis about its authorship is that it was written by Roman Melodos, probably early in the sixth century, although its origin has been associated also with the miraculous salvation of Constantinople from three consecutive foreign sieges in the seventh and eighth centuries. By the early ninth century, the hymn had already been translated into Latin. The earliest extant copy of a Slavonic translation dates from the twelfth century, but there is speculation that the translation was actually made in the Cyrilo-Methodian period (see Kozhukharov, “Akathistos,” 57–58). For a parallel edition of the Byzantine and Slavic texts, see Gove, *Akathistos Hymn*, and for an excellent study of the Byzantine tradition, see Wellesz, “Akathistos.”

33. In Greek this salutation reads, *Chaire, nymphe anymphon*; the Slavonic translation, *Radui sia, neviasto neneviastnaia*, is literal, preserving the original paragon that is lost in the standard English rendition. All salutations in the Greek originals are marked by the anaphora *chaire* (rejoice), hence their generic name, *chairetismoï*.

34. On the Jesus prayer and its importance for the Orthodox worship of the Name of God, see Alfeev, *Sviashchennaia taina Tserkvi*, 166–287, and, specifically for the *Akathistos of the Most Sweet Jesus* and its background, 197–99; cf. Kozlov, “Akafist,” 84–85.

35. As part of the Nicene Creed, this list belongs to the core of the liturgical repertoire.

36. See details in my article “Naming the Nameless,” where I draw general conclusions about the preeminence of the catalogue pattern in Eastern Orthodox rhetorical practice.

37. From this point of the sequence, the speaking position ostensibly shifts from the community of Christians to the Church as a communal body.

38. This is my translation from the edition in Makarii, *Velikie minei-cheti: Noiabr'* 13–15, 1132–61; for the Greek original, see Migne, *PG*, 52:395–414.

39. My source for the Slavonic text is a sixteenth-century copy of the encomium available on microfilm at the Hilandar Resource Center for Medieval Studies, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, catalogue description in Matejic and Thomas, *Catalog*, Hil. 440, fols. 116r–130r. For the Greek original, see Halkin, *Bibliotheca hagiographica graeca*, 2:59. The text was translated into Slavonic in Bulgaria in the late fourteenth century. In the Slavonic tradition, it is either erroneously attributed to Theodoros Daphnopatis (tenth century) or treated as anonymous.

40. The genre of figure poems, or *carmina figurata*, is treated comprehensively in Higgins, *Pattern Poetry*; Adler and Ernst, *Texts als Figur*; and Ernst, *Carmen Figuratum*.

41. For a photographic reproduction of the manuscript original of the poem, see Ernst, *Carmen Figuratum*, 184. The list poem is unpacked in the edition of the text by Ernst Dümmler, *Poetae Latini*, 156–57. Dümmler's edition includes a selection of other figurative list-poems by Josephus Scottus.

42. The beginning of a morning prayer to the Lord from *The Orthodox Prayer Book* (8). According to Florenskii, the names that follow the first unequivocal address function as "an ontological motivation" for the petition that follows ("Slovesnoe sluzhenie: Molitva," esp. 74–78). In accordance with this remark, we note that the appellations following the initial address are usually thematically related to the prayer's specific request. Thus, for example, if it is a prayer before a meal, the names will be semantically related to food and the Eucharist, such as "heavenly life-giving Bread, true Meal" (see Nachtigal, *Euchologium Sinaiticum*, 37), but if it asks for the fertility of a flock, the names will be fittingly pastoral, for example, "true Lamb" (33).

43. Sergieff, *My Life in Christ*, 431.

44. For the movement of the Ioannites, see Kizenko, *Prodigal Saint*, 197–232, esp. 200 for the special emphasis that Father John's followers placed on the saint's original prayers.

45. See Panteleimon, *Zhizn', podvigi, chudesa i prorochestva*, 205. I am grateful to Nadieszda Kizenko for referring me to this edition.

#### CHAPTER FIVE

1. The earliest extant version is known from seventh-century Latin sources, although it is presumably of Byzantine origin, and the earliest known Slavonic version is documented in a Russian fragment from the beginning of the twelfth century that is preserved in a single folio appended to a later manuscript in the Monastery of St. Catherine in Sinai (see Taube, "Kievan Fragment"). For a comprehensive review of the Slavonic erotapocritical tradition, see Santos Otero, *Handschriftliche Überlieferung*, 2, sec. 16, "Conversatio trium hierarcharum"; cf. Thomson, "Apocrypha Slavica," for numerous corrections and additions. Thomson's stipulations about the genre deserve to be quoted in full: "This title ["Conversatio trium hierarcharum"] is here used as a generic term to signify apocryphal erotapocritical literature in general, although strictly speaking its use should be restricted to collections of *erotapocriseis* in which the names of SS. Basil, Gregory, and John appear" (91). Hereafter, I use this title only in the latter, more restrictive sense.

2. Both texts were made available from eighteenth-century copies in Ivan Franko's *Apokrifi i legendy* (9, 16).

3. I quote the text from an apocryphal Prayer Book (seventeenth century), Serbian National Library, MS Slav 636, fols. 11v–13r. See Iatsimirskii, "K istorii," which includes the only existing study of the text and its history (no. 3 (1913): 1–22). The term *false prayer* (*orationes falsae, lozhnye molitvy*) is used in medieval studies to refer loosely to a vast and apparently amorphous area of texts that are overtly dedicated to magical ends, specifically healing and protection. They vary in structure from direct equivalents of orthodox prayers and exorcisms to instructions for magical rituals and inscriptions on magical objects. Such a distinction, however, is mostly academic, for they are equally credited with inherent

magical powers, and their modes of employment overlap accordingly. The term itself is laden with ambiguities. Originally an ecclesiastical label, it is designed to sanction a group of texts as unorthodox (i.e., not of the right doctrine) from the standpoint of official Church criteria for distinguishing between religion and magic. Therefore its taxonomic efficacy in secular scholarship is rather limited at best.

4. The exact provenance of this codex is unknown, but most scholars accept that it originated in the Western territories of Bulgaria. Though some scholars attribute the manuscript to the first decade of the fourteenth century, by content it is closer to the book production of the thirteenth century. The codex was clearly designed as a book for individual reading and reflects a peculiar mixture of standard religious instructions with noncanonical and apocryphal texts. The abundance of examples from the latter group is particularly interesting: the codex includes, among other substandard readings, the earliest Slavonic copy of the old apocryphal cycle about King Abgar and a copy of the Bogomil apocryphon, *Legend of the Cross*, attributed to the Bulgarian heresiarch Jeremiah. Slavists deem the codex especially valuable for its inclusion of the earliest extant copy of Monk Khrabr's *On the Letters*, a tenth-century eulogy of the Slavonic alphabet. For details, see the critical edition of the codex in Miklas and Zagrebin, *Berlinski sbornik*. A typeset edition of the text itself is available in Iatsimirskii, "K istorii" (no. 3 (1913): 9–10).

5. I am familiar with twenty-six manuscript copies, which are available in the textological appendix of Izmirlieva, *Christian Art of Listing* (192–211). The text was included in three early Cyrillic printed books (sixteenth/seventeenth century), one of which had as many as four separate editions. Even though we do not have precise information today about the actual number of printed copies for each of these editions, printing certainly ensured the text's circulation and continuity on a much larger scale.

6. By the end of the sixteenth century, the dissemination of the amulet extended to the Russian lands as well (Ryan, *Bathhouse at Midnight*, 294–95). This East Slavic tradition, which we still know only sporadically, appears to follow directly Vuković's printed edition of the text, retaining its South Slavic linguistic characteristics. That is why, I suppose, Iatsimirskii ("K istorii," 7–8) treats copies of both Balkan and East Slavic provenance as "South Slavic." Significantly, Ryan's single example, a sixteenth-century copy from the Iosif-Volokolamsk Monastery published in Tikhonravov, *Pamiatniki*, 2: 339–44, is the only extant manuscript copy that completely reproduces Vuković's version, including the exegetical addendum (about this version and its routine truncation in manuscript copies, see chapter 10).

7. Some copies of the text feature an additional instruction for invoking the names daily as an exorcism. As such instructions are exceedingly rare in the extant sources, however, we should assume that the text's principal use was as an amulet.

8. Most copies of the text instruct that the list should be "worn on one's person," and usually the formula is appended by the adverb "purely." This requirement for ritual cleanliness seems to refer to the state of the manuscript and to the documented practice of keeping the text-amulet in a leather bag close to the body to avoid staining or corruption.

9. Robert Mathiesen includes this text in his review article on Slavic magic, "Magic in Slavia Orthodoxa," under the rubric "Charms, Spells, Incantations, and Magical Prayers."

10. Note that Church Slavonic has no grammatical articles, so the proposition of the heading is ambiguous: it could be both "these are [some of the] names of God, 72 in number" or "these are the names of God, 72 in number."



11. For the symbolism of 72 in general, see Spiridakis, “Ο αριθμός εβδομήκοντα δύο”; [Kretzenbacher, “Die heilige Rundzahl 72”]; and Izmirlieva, “72 i chisloviat kod.” Some reference books also provide useful overviews: see Schimmel, *Mystery of Numbers*, 264–68; and Meyer and Suntrup, *Lexikon*, 761–64; cf. Chevalier and Gheerbrant, *Dictionary of Symbols*, 866–87 and 989, for some pertinent details.

12. Some of the stubborn traces of the duodecimal system are visible even today: measurements in length and weight based on 12 are still current in the United Kingdom and the United States, and we still sell eggs, doughnuts, and oysters by the dozen everywhere in the Western world.

13. This item is missing in the second copy (see Franko, *Apokrifi i legendy*, 16). Otherwise, the two copies offer completely identical versions of the entry.

14. The text belongs to another version of the *Discourse*, published by Nikolai Tikhonravov from a seventeenth-century copy (*Pamiatniki*, 2:433). A shorter, seventeenth/eighteenth-century variation of the same entry is found in A. N. Pypin (*Lozhnyia i otrechennia knigi*, 169). The answer in Tikhonravov’s version concludes somewhat unexpectedly with a shift to another number: “And the different bones in men are 295, and just as many are the joints.” This “deviation” supports my previous disclaimer about the dangers of generalizing an erotapocritical worldview without actually contradicting the validity of my more specific conclusions about the role of the number 72.

15. See Bychkov, *Katalog*, 188, MS #120, fol. 423. Note that the same manuscript has a particular focus on lists of names: it features, among other lists, the names of the days in Greek, the names of the letters in the Slavonic alphabet, the names of the great mountains and of the great rivers, and a list of biblical characters: the man who made the Holy Cross, the man who pierced the Savior’s rib, the man who hit Christ on the cheek, the two thieves who were crucified with him, the woman with the flow of blood, and the paralytic.

16. *The 72 Names of the Theotokos* appears across the extant sources as a permanent text-satellite of *The 72 Names of the Lord*: only one of all the available copies is independent from the Lord’s names, and only three copies of the Lord’s names are not accompanied by it. Iatsimirskii pioneered the study of both texts, again in conjunction with one another (see Iatsimirskii, “K istorii,” no. 3 (1913): 1–22).

17. Hereafter cited as *Jerusalem* 22. For this monument, see chapter 8.

18. *Jerusalem* 22, fol. 197r.

19. As I have already mentioned, one copy of the erotapocritical entry includes an additional class, the 72 members of the human body.

#### CHAPTER SIX

1. Faith medicine, also called somewhat misleadingly “medicinal magic,” covers a large body of practices addressed to both curative and prophylactic ends. Most important for my purposes are the curative practice of exorcism and the prophylactic practice of wearing written amulets, or phylacteries. In his analysis of “magical healing,” Keith Thomas emphasizes its advantage in a society with little or no science-based medical care: it is painless, it is psychotherapeutic in relying on the natural tendency of the human body to self-heal aided by the therapeutic power of imagination, and it can be positively

spectacular (see *Religion and the Decline of Magic*, 206–7). The prophylactic practices of faith medicine may be evaluated in a similar manner.

2. The most comprehensive study of these narratives in the Byzantino-Slavic context is Izmirlieva, “The Actiology of the Seventy-Two Diseases.” See also Pradel, *Griechische und süditalienische Gebete, Beschwörungen und Rezepte des Mittelalters* (36–37 and 73–75), and Spiridakis, “Ο αριθμός εβδομήκοντα δύο” (409–11), who offer useful references to the available Greek sources. The concept itself has been addressed only tangentially in broader studies of the number 72 and its cross-cultural symbolism, most notably in Marzell, “Die Zahl 72”; Kretzenbacher, “Die heilige Rundzahl 72”; and the still useful study by Steinschneider, “Die kanonische Zahl der muhammedanischen Secten.”

3. The Greek version, which was consolidated in pre-Christian times, is considered to be the direct source of the other five, although, arguably, they all share a common Jewish origin. A synoptic edition, which includes the Greek and Latin texts in the original and translations of the Slavonic, Georgian, and Armenian versions, is available in Anderson and Stone, eds., *Books of Adam and Eve*. The standard edition of the Slavonic text in the original (with a parallel German translation) is Jagić, “Slavische Beiträge zu den biblischen Apocryphen.” See Stone, *The Literature of Adam and Eve*, for a full treatment of the literature on this cycle, including a review of the hypotheses regarding its origin and time of consolidation (with comprehensive bibliography).

4. See Jagić, “Slavische Beiträge zu den biblischen Apocryphen,” 21 and 86. The passage varies greatly across the Slavonic tradition (see, for example, I. Porfir'ev, *Apokrificheskiia skazaniia*, 213; cf. Tikhonravov, *Pamiatniki*, 1:302; and Sokolov, *Materialy i zametki*, 40–42). The Slavonic version is consistent in its use of 72, although the Greek evidence, despite the occasional registration of this number, favors its “rounded” variant 70, as do most of the other versions (see Anderson and Stone, *Books of Adam and Eve*, 28). For occasional occurrences of 72 in the Greek tradition of the text, see Wells, “Books of Adam and Eve,” 142. For further details on the Byzantine and Slavic evidence, including the various terms for diseases used in this context, see Izmirlieva, “Actiology,” 184–85.

5. The pseudo-epigraphon is documented by two Greek recensions, one long and one short, both in Schmidt's *Le Testament grec d'Abraham*. Slavonic, Romanian, Coptic, and Ethiopian versions are also extant. For the manuscript tradition of the Slavonic and the Romanian versions (with a complete bibliography of the editions available), see Turdeanu, *Apocryphes slaves et roumains*, 201–38.

6. The English translation follows Box, *Testament of Abraham*, 35. The standard edition of the Greek text is in Schmidt, *Le Testament grec d'Abraham*, 164.20.1–2. The Slavonic version, which represents a truncation of the short Greek recension, does not register this passage.

7. As a possible source of—or at least a curious parallel to—this Semitic trope, we should recall the Egyptian myth of the cynocephalus who dies piecemeal over a period of 72 days, a belief that probably determined the identical length of the Pharaoh's funeral ceremonies in ancient Egypt (see Marzell, “Die Zahl 72,” 71).

8. The standard Eastern Orthodox version of this verse, 89:10 according to the Slavonic numbering, reads, “As for the days of our years, in their span they be threescore years and ten.”

9. Dante, *Banquet*, pt. 4, chap. 23, 181–82.

10. See Dante, *Inferno*, 344, note to canto 1:1–3.

11. The seventeenth-century text entitled *Discourse on How God Created Adam* is published in Pypin (*Lozhnyia i otrechennia knigi*, 15). The text offers a curious numerical symmetry: God transforms the seven days that Adam spent in Paradise into the seventy years that number a man's life, and the week of creating the world into the seven thousand years that number the world's existence.

12. Novaković, "Apokrifske priče," 201.

13. See Pypin, *Lozhnyia i otrechennia knigi*, 12–15.

14. See Kovachev, "Narodna astronomia i meteorologija," 49–50. The number in that particular record is not 72 but 41: the devil makes 41 (71) holes, the Lord fills up 40 (70) of them. I suppose that the substitution could be explained by a confusion of 7 and 4 based on their graphic similarity (the published copy of the legend is from the nineteenth century and, as is to be expected, Arabic numbers are used throughout).

15. See Petrov, "Ugorusskie zagovory," 55. The manuscript originated from the Carpathian homeland of the Slavic ethnic group usually referred to as Rusyns. Nowadays, the Rusyns populate the borderlands between Ukraine, the Slovak Republic, and Poland, have a diaspora in Vojvodina, and speak East Slavic dialects.

16. The amulet, reportedly made for a man named Dukas, was written on a paper scroll to be worn around the neck. The scroll was wrapped in a piece of linen cloth, sewn to a leather bag and then placed in a silver case for maximal protection (see Abbott, *Macedonian Folklore*, 238 and 365–66). The earliest available evidence of the text is found in a Greek fifteenth-century codex of false prayers and is published in Vassiliev, *Anecdota*, 323–27. The oldest extant Slavonic copy of the text is still unpublished. It is part of the seventeenth-century addendum to a fifteenth-century Psalter in the Slavonic manuscript collection of the National Library SS Cyril and Methodius, Sofia, Bulgaria, Manuscript and Rare Book Collection, MS Slav, 458, fols. 112v–115r (for details about the text and this particular copy, see "Appendix 1: A Slavic Exorcism of the 72 Diseases" in Izmirlieva, *Christian Art of Listing*, 183–91; cf. Izmirlieva, "Aetiology," 181–95).

17. Vassiliev, *Anecdota*, 324; cf. National Library SS Cyril and Methodius, MS Slav 458, fol. 114v.

18. Compare the following telling passage in the Slavonic version: "All you, evil powers. . .return to the head of the one who created you" (National Library SS Cyril and Methodius, MS Slav 458, fol. 115r).

19. For a variety of Greek texts with such topoi, see Spiridakis, "Ο αριθμός εβδόμηκοντα δύο," which provides an extensive bibliography of primary sources. From the Slavic material see, for example, the formula "I chased you away from the 77 members and sent you to the 70 unholy nations" from a sixteenth-century prayer for shooting pain (Kačanovskij, "Apokrifne molitve," 156); or the mention of "70 joints in the arm and the leg and the elbow" in a prayer from a nineteenth-century codex (Vinogradov, *Zagovory*, 15). Savushkina provides rich East Slavic folk material in *Russkie zagovory*—see # 47 (73 joints); #145 (70 bones, 70 joints, and 70 tendons); #197 (73 herbs for 73 joints); #199 (77 joints with 77 tendons); and #223 (72 joints and 72 tendons). See similar examples in Ryan, *Bathhouse at Midnight*, 181 (77 veins/sinews); 183 (73 members).

20. See a reference to 70 seals used as protection from diseases in a fourteenth-century Missal in Kovačević, "Nekoliko priloga." Oikonomidis reports that one of the Greek

versions of the well-studied “legend” of St. Sissinius lists the 72 names of the disease-causing female demon *Gylou* (“Ἐξορκισμοί,” 22). According to Ryan, “shaking fevers” (*triasavitsy*) are personified in Russian texts as 77 evil women or, conversely, the 77 fevers are identified with Herod’s daughters, who were turned into 77 evil winds or 77 flies (*Bath-house at Midnight*, 244–45).

## CHAPTER SEVEN

1. I quote the passage from Weigand’s article, “Two and Seventy Languages,” 248. Weigand points out as his immediate source the edition by Alexander Turner Cory, *The Hieroglyphics of Horapollon Nilous* (London: William Pickering, 1840).
2. In some versions of the myth, the cynocephalus is said to have 72 limbs or joints, which means it is also made up of 72 parts and thus identical in structure to the populated lands (see Reitzenstein, *Poimandres*, 265–66, n. 3).
3. Cited in Weigand, “Two and Seventy Languages,” 242.
4. Besides the indispensable article by Weigand, see Séd, “Les douze hebdomades”; and Sauer, “Ein mittelalterlicher Topos,” and his “Ergänzungen.”
5. Gen. 11:7. Note that the name Babel comes from the Hebrew verb *balal*, “to confuse”: “It was called Babel, because there the Lord confused the language of all the earth” (Gen. 11:9).
6. The metonymic transfer is supported by the double meaning of tongue as “language” and as “people” in both Greek (*glossa*) and Church Slavonic (*iazyk*).
7. Bruce Metzger provides an excellent summary of the sources (“Seventy or Seventy-Two,” 303). See also Baumgarten (“Duodecimal Courts,” 76, n. 66) and Burrows (“Number Seventy in Semitic,” 391).
8. See Metzger, “Seventy or Seventy-Two,” 303; cf. Scholem, *On the Kabbalah*, 62.
9. *Targum Pseudo-Jonathan, Genesis*, 50. In another version of the same Targum, “at that time he [the Lord] established the boundaries of the nations according to the total of seventy souls of Israel who went down to Egypt” (quoted in Baumgarten, “Duodecimal Courts,” 68, n. 29). This version connects the triple homology of 70 angels, 70 nations, and 70 languages/writing systems with the number of the descendants of Israel who went to Egypt, thus reorienting the source of the 70 nations from Noah to Jacob, the progenitor of the 12 tribes. Compare the midrashic legend that angel Gabriel taught Joseph the 70 languages, as well as its offshoots found in Hebrew and Aramaic amulets (Schiffman and Swartz, *Hebrew and Aramaic Incantation Texts*, 23, 151, 156).
10. The number 72 is particularly visible in the late Jewish apocalyptic tradition; see details in Baumgarten, “Duodecimal Courts,” 76, n. 66. There, note also his reference to the use of 72 for both the number of languages and the number of heavenly princes in 3 Enoch.
11. See Borst, *Der Turmbau von Babel*, 1:230; Migne, *PG*, 7:958; English translation in Roberts and Donaldson, *Ante-Nicean Fathers*, 1:455.
12. See Weigand, “Two and Seventy Languages,” 249. Sauer offers a selection of relevant patristic passages in “Ein mittelalterlicher Topos,” esp. 30 and 39–40; cf. his no less informative “Ergänzungen.”

13. See St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* 16:3–12, in Migne, *PL*, 12: 343–44; cf. Weigand, “Two and Seventy Languages,” 251–53.

14. For selected Greek sources, see Spiridakis, “Ο αριθμός εβδομήκοντα δύο,” 412–18. Weigand provides a rich panorama of the dispersion of this idea in the Latin West. The same tradition also affected apocryphal revelations of the Eastern Church, such as the Syrian *Cave of Treasures* and the Ethiopian *Book of Adam* (see Weigand, “Two and Seventy Languages,” 249). For the Ethiopian tradition, see Strelcyn “Une tradition éthiopienne”; and Cowley, *Ethiopian Biblical Interpretation*, 20–24.

15. Ostrowski, Birnbaum, and Lunt, eds., *The Povest' vremennykh let*, 18–19.

16. Miltenova, “Skazanie za Sivila,” 63; there is also a Greek parallel. This otherwise unattested saying of Jesus is addressed to the 72 disciples and is evidently based on Luke 10:1. Paul Alexander, to whom we owe the most complete study of the Greek original, has argued that the passage was added to the fourth-century text of *Oracula Sibyllina* in the following form: “The word which you received from me, preach it to the people of the 72 languages.” These peoples later reappear in the text as the population of Constantinople, thus making the city a true microcosm of the world (see details in Alexander, *Oracle of Baalbeck*, 136–37; cf. 56, 92–93, and 108).

17. The text belongs to another version of the *Discourse*, published from a seventeenth-century copy in Tikhonravov, *Pamiatniki*, 433.

18. Pypin, *Lozhnyia i otrechennyya knigi*, 169.

19. See Petkanova, *Stara b<sup>l</sup>garska literatura*, 1:341; cf. Miltenova, *Stara b<sup>l</sup>garska literatura*, 5:348, for a different compilation based on a copy from the end of the seventeenth century.

20. Miltenova, “Razumnik-ukáz,” 34; the second redaction of the text features a similar passage (see 39). Cf. another version of the same text entitled *Questions: Of How Many Parts Was Adam Made?* published from two different copies in Tikhonravov, *Pamiatniki*, 446, and in Lavrov, *Apokrificheskie teksty*, 119. For Latin versions of the same *Interrogatio*, see Sauer, “Ein mittelalterlicher Topos,” 40–41, #7.

21. The prayer is published in Almazov, “Vracheval'nyia molitvy,” from a sixteenth-century Slavonic copy with a parallel edition of the Greek equivalent, also from a sixteenth-century copy (508–9). A similar Slavonic eighteenth-century version containing the same formula appears in Vinogradov, *Zagovory*, 79.

22. An edition of the Greek text with an English translation and excellent apparatus appears in Hadas, *Aristeas to Philocrates*. For a comprehensive account of the origin, transmission, significance, and study of the text, see Jellicoe, *Septuagint and Modern Study*, 29–58. For a Slavic version of the legend, see Taube, “Une Source inconnue.”

23. On the 12 tribes of Israel, descended from the sons of Jacob, see 1 Kings 18:31. The lists of the 12 tribes do not always agree with one another, and the number varies from 11 to 13 with the exclusion of Joseph, the inclusion of his two sons, Ephraim and Manasseh, and the exclusion of Levy, the progenitor of the priestly tribe that was not assigned a special territory. For more details, see Whybray, “Tribes of Israel.”

24. According to Aristeas, the translation of the *Septuaginta Duo* included only the five books of the Torah, but in the Christian tradition it was extended to include the entire Greek Old Testament. The first author to document this extension is Justin Martyr in the *First Apology* 31 (see Jellicoe, *Septuagint and Modern Study*, 42).

25. Although the oldest sources agree on the number 72, the number of the translators in the subsequent tradition varies predictably between 70 and 72 (see Metzger, “Seventy or Seventy-Two,” 303), a discrepancy that is reflected also by the standard designation of the translation itself. It is generally accepted today that the number 70 is a natural syncope of 72, a shift that has been facilitated by the stable association of 70 with the Elders of Moses, whose commission as a representative body of the twelve tribes is directly related to the revelation of the Law at Sinai (Exod. 24).

26. The list is preserved in some of the later sources. Epiphanius of Salamis (ca. 315–406 CE) includes it in his own elaborated version in *De Mensuris et Ponderibus* (pt. 3ff.), extant in full only in Syriac (see an edition in Dean, *Epiphanius’ Treatise on Weights and Measures*). Michael E. Stone reports on an Armenian excerpt from Epiphanius’s treatise entitled *Concerning the Seventy-Two Translators Who Were on the Island of Pharos* (see Stone, “Concerning the Seventy-Two Translators,” 334–35).

27. *Letter of Aristeas*, sec. 307 (emphasis added). I quote the source from the segments provided (in translation) in Peters, *Judaism, Christianity, Islam*, 2:15.

28. See Irenaeus, “Against Heresies,” in Roberts and Donaldson, *The Ante-Nicean Fathers*, 1. Weigand (“Two and Seventy Languages,” 250), erroneously identifies the source in question as Philo of Judea’s *De Vita Mosis* (2.25–44), which does not mention separate cells, and, although it emphasizes that each version of the translation was identical to all others, “as though it had been dictated to each by an invisible prompter” (Peters, *Judaism, Christianity, Islam*, 2:16), it never explicitly points out their number. An explicit mention of 72 separate cells, however, is reportedly present in the Talmud (see Baumgarten, “Duodecimal Courts,” 76, n. 65), which gave ground to Hadas to consider Irenaeus’s embellishment as going back to the Tannaitic times (first or second century CE; see Hadas, *Aristeas to Philocrates*, 83).

Epiphanius offers a notable modification of the tradition in *On Weights and Measures*: the translators worked in pairs, isolated in 36 cells. Significantly, the Slavonic tradition follows the same pattern: “The 72 translators of the books were sent from Jerusalem, six from each tribe. Ptolemy built for them 36 huts on the island of Pharos and locked them in, two by two” (see Taube, “Une Source inconnue,” 120). This peculiarity could have been introduced, as Sidney Jellicoe suggests, by the Gospel of Luke, where the 72 disciples are sent by the Lord “in pairs” (Luke 10:1; see Jellicoe, *Septuagint and Modern Study*, 45).

29. Peters, *Judaism, Christianity, Islam*, 2:14.

30. See Schimmel, *Mystery*, 122–23. Note that six is also a perfect number in the arithmetic sense—it equals both the sum of its factors and their product ( $1 + 2 + 3 = 6$ ;  $1 \times 2 \times 3 = 6$ ).

31. Schimmel calls the kind of “totality” represented by 72 “fullness composed of different elements” (*Mystery*, 266).

32. Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, 203ff.

33. *Ibid.*, 208.

34. In fact, the distribution of 70 and 72 is so balanced across both the early Greek and later versional evidence of these verses that the most fastidious among biblical scholars prefer to render the number by the clumsy hybrid “seventy(-two).” To repeat Metzger’s competent summary of the manuscript data (see Metzger, “Seventy or Seventy-Two”), 72

is featured in Georgian and Persian sources, in the Vulgate, in most of the Syriac, and in the chief Alexandrian (Coptic) texts. Conversely, alternative Syriac and Coptic texts, and all the so-called Caesarean witnesses, along with the Ethiopian versions, Gothic texts, Luther's translation, and the Slavonic Bible, all favor 70 instead. Regrettably, however, Metzger leaves out of sight much of the conceptual scope of the number 72 that was cultivated in pre-Christian cultures.

35. See Jellicoe, "St. Luke and the 'Seventy (-Two).'"

36. If we accept the primacy of 72, as Jellicoe prompts us to do in "St. Luke and the 'Seventy (-Two)," we can easily attribute the subsequent transformation of this number into 70 to the interplay of at least three independent factors. First, palaeographically, it is highly possible for a scribe to omit accidentally the second part of a number ("two"), especially since the word is repeated in the immediate context of Luke 10:1 (Luke 10:17). Second, the rounding of a precise number (i.e., of 72 to 70) is psychologically much more plausible than the opposite transformation. Third, the general synonymy of the two numbers in the Judeo-Christian culture and their interchangeability in shifting contexts (see above) largely facilitate the appearance of a variant of Luke's passage featuring 70 instead of 72 disciples, since the simplification of the number does not in fact alter the original symbolic implications of the numerical mention.

37. For patristic references, see Meyer and Suntrup, *Lexikon*, 762.

38. This interpretation is not exclusive. According to alternative patristic readings, the number of the disciples is prefigured by the bells on the robe of the high priest, which tradition holds to be 72 (Exod. 28:33). As the product of 8, a number associated with Christ's Resurrection on the "eighth" day after Sabbath, and 9, the number of the angelic orders, 72 is seen as a symbol for the triumphant celebration of the new messianic age on high. Last but not least, as the product of 24, the number of hours in each day, and 3, the number of the Holy Trinity, it is said to represent also continuous glorification of the Trinity, which is the essence of apostolic work (see Meyer, *Die Zahlenallegorese*, 168).

39. See Matt. 10:2–4 and Mark 3:16–19; cf. Acts 1:26 for the replacement of Judas by Matthias.

40. See Metzger, "Names for the Nameless," 547.

41. See editions in Schermann, *Prophetarum vitae fabulosae*, 107–70.

42. See Metzger, "Seventy or Seventy-Two," 304.

43. For further details about the Slavonic sources, see my article "From Babel to Christ and Beyond."

44. Baumgarten, "Duodecimal Courts."

45. "It [the Heavenly Jerusalem] has a great high wall with twelve gates, and at the gates twelve angels, and on the gates are inscribed the names of the twelve tribes of the Israelites. . . . And the wall of the city has twelve foundations, and on them are the twelve names of the twelve apostles of the Lamb" (Rev. 21:12–14). Note also that the function of the 12 apostles as a deliberative body of the Final Judgment is legitimated by Matt. 19:28 and Luke 22:30 as a central part of their legacy in the Christ.

46. "Whatever the Holy One, blessed be he, created above, he likewise created below" (*Exodus Rabbah* 33:4; cited in Baumgarten, "Duodecimal Courts," 78).

47. *Sanhedrin* is a Hebraized form of the Greek term *Synedrion*, "council" (lit. "sitting together"). The Greek term dates from antiquity, though in Christian language it is

associated with “the council of the Apostles” and its continuation in the Council of the Presbyters, which inherits their esteem in the eyes of the Church. In the meaning of the High Council (the Great Sanhedrin), it refers to the highest indigenous governing body in Judea, which functioned under the presidency of the ruling high priest and included as members adult male representatives of the most prominent priestly families, the elders of the tribes, and scholars or scribes. It had the ultimate authority not only in religious matters, but in legal and governmental affairs as well, as long as it did not encroach on the authority of the Roman procurator. Its history goes back at least to Pompey the Great who, in 66 BCE, reorganized Palestine as part of a bigger project of subjugating the Greek East to the Roman Senate, dividing it into five councils. In the context of the New Testament, the Sanhedrin is both the locus of opposition to Jesus and his movement, and the venue of the trial of the Christ and his followers. In the Rabbinic period (ca. 200 CE), “Sanhedrin” became a technical term for the rabbinic court, and the Mishnah devotes a special section to its structure and function (see details in Overman, “Sanhedrin,” in Metzger and Coogan, eds., *Oxford Companion to the Bible*, 677–78).

48. For scriptural reference to the 70 elders, see Numbers 11:16, 24–25 and Exod. 24:1, 9; on the 70 descendants of Israel, see Exod. 1:5, “The total number of people born to Jacob was seventy”; cf. Gen. 46:27: “All the persons of the house of Jacob who came into Egypt were seventy.”

49. Baumgarten, “Duodecimal Courts,” 57.

50. The correspondence, in fact, is so exact that one is tempted to assume that Ptolemy’s request to get six translators from each tribe was modeled after the structure of the Sanhedrin, though such an assumption is difficult to prove in historical terms. Both the translation and, in all probability, the legend on which Aristeas based his account predate the rabbinic courts, although the *Letter* itself could have been composed around the same time when the Sanhedrin was being constituted. The particular differentiation within the number may be a later (first-century) addition, while the original number 72 in the original legend was undifferentiated, derived most probably from the older belief that the number of peoples on earth were 72.

51. See Meyer and Suntrup, *Lexicon*, 732; cf. Schimmel, *Mystery*, 266, though her biblical reference is erroneous.

52. Kaplan, *Bahir*, pt. 1, 94, 34.

53. The number 72 had a no less significant career in the making of the Islamic political imagination: from the 73 Muslim sects envisioned by the Prophet Mohammed, of which 72 shall perish and 1 shall be saved, to the 72 martyrs in the battle at Karbala (680), which was the constitutive Shi’ite event (see details in Steinschneider, “Die kanonische Zahl”; cf. Schimmel, *Mystery*, 264–68). In that sense, the political significance of this numerical symbol is truly shared by all Abrahamic religions.

#### CHAPTER EIGHT

1. A microfilm of the codex is available in The Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. (see *Checklist of the Manuscripts in the Libraries of the Greek and Armenian Patriarchates in Jerusalem*, Micro # 5017 Slav. 22). The most complete description of the codex to date is Krasnosel’sev, *Slavianskiiia rukopisi*, 21–24. I am indebted to Klimentina



Ivanova for sharing with me her unpublished description of the codex, which is much more detailed than Krasnosel'tsev's. The codex is hereafter often cited parenthetically in the text: for example, (fol. 445v).

2. *The 72 Names of the Lord* is located on fols. 195r–196r, and *The 72 Names of the Theotokos* appears on fols. 196v–197r.

3. See Krasnosel'tsev, *Slavianskiia rukopisi*, 21–26; Rozov, "Srpski rukopisi," 120–21; Nedomački, *O srpskim rukopisima*, 94.

4. The colophon, in the handwriting of the (principal) scribe, reads as follows: "In the year 1498. Brethren, forgive that [we wrote] with a sinful hand or incorrectly from the source. You forgive us, and Christ the King [will forgive] you. Amen" (fol. 445v).

5. According to the written sources, the monastery (situated today near the Israel Museum in Jerusalem) was founded by the Georgian monk Prochor between 1039 and 1056 and remained for centuries the most important Georgian religious and spiritual center in the Holy Land (see Tsagareli, "Pamyatniki"). Since 1685, the monastery has been in the possession of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate.

6. According to Klimentina Ivanova, the codex could have been written by two hands, the first one tentatively linked to fols. 78r–131v and the second one (which identifies the principal scribe—incidentally the one who also wrote our lists) with the rest of the codex. The handwriting, however, is fairly similar throughout, and the identification is uncertain.

7. The only existing article specifically dedicated to this feature is Ivanov, "Preglas na glasna U > O v b'lgarskite govori" (see also Mirchev, "Nevrokopskiat govor," esp. 43).

8. Krasnosel'tsev, *Slavianskiia rukopisi*, 26; Rozov, "Srpski rukopisi," 121.

9. The larger part of the codex comprises hymnographic material for the calendar cycle.

10. Krasnosel'tsev's main example is a magic recipe "for love" that consists mostly of what appear to be names (see Krasnosel'tsev, *Slavianskiia rukopisi*, 23, 27). For later speculation on the possible Jewish connection, see Nedomački, "O srpskim rukopisima," 94).

11. Among the comprehensive studies of the Kabbalah available in English, see especially Scholem, *On the Kabbalah and Its Symbolism*; his invaluable "Kabbalah"; and Idel's more recent work, *Kabbalah: New Perspectives*.

12. For a succinct summary of the concept and the history of the practical Kabbalah, see Scholem, "Kabbalah," 632–38 (with bibliography).

13. Scholem, "Kabbalah," 634.

14. Scholem, *On the Kabbalah and Its Symbolism*, 99.

15. Gaster, *Sword of Moses*, 163.

16. For a definitive history of the Ottoman Empire from that period, see Inalcik, *Ottoman Empire*.

17. Ocak, "Religion," 187.

18. See details in Braude and Lewis, *Christians and Jews*.

19. The Eastern Orthodox Christians in the Balkan part of the Ottoman Empire were hardly a homogeneous group. Ethnically, they encompassed Greeks, Slavs, Albanians, and Walachians, among others. They also included a broad spectrum of Christian sects, most numerous of which were the Bogomils.

20. The relatively liberal religious policy of the Ottomans toward the other religions of the Book is a topos in Ottoman historiography. At the core of this inclusive attitude, scholars usually place the doctrinal emphasis of Islam on the unity of God. Historically, Muslims saw themselves as the true heirs to the faith of the biblical patriarchs and prophets, from Abraham and Moses all the way to Christ. Thus they openly acknowledged their links to both Jews and Christians, who, in contrast, had forged their respective identities through a painful process of separation that left a long-lasting legacy of hostility between them (see Peters, *Judaism, Christianity, Islam*, 1:xxiii–iv).

21. Mark Mazower repeatedly quotes an account by Ukrainian Catholics who visited Salonica in the eighteenth century and were struck by the perfunctory character of Orthodox observance (see his *Salonica*, 66). Though this source is from a later period, it reveals the end result of a process that began with the Ottoman annexation of the Balkan lands: one of the first decrees of Gennadios Scholarios, the first Greek patriarch after the fall of Constantinople (1454–60?), was to relax the official sacramental rules and the doctrinal norms within the new Christian *millet*.

22. For the history of the expulsion, see Yerushalmi, “Exile and Expulsion.” For the Ottoman Empire as the preferred destination of the massive exodus, see, for example, Hava Tirosh-Samuelson, “Postexpulsion Philosophic Literature,” 227; Ocak, “Religion”; and Mazower, *Salonica*, 46–52.

23. An excellent source on the role of Salonica in the exodus of the Sephardim is Mazower’s *Salonica*, 49ff. On the lives and culture of the Ottoman Jews more generally, see Epstein, *Ottoman Jewish Communities*, and Shmuelevitz, *Jews of the Ottoman Empire*.

24. According to the old Babylonian calendar, the world was created 5508 years before the birth of Christ, which makes 1492 CE—the same year that marked the expulsion of the Jews from Spain—the end of the seventh millennium. The apocryphal belief that the world would come to an end at the end of the seventh millennium was based on the conflation of two biblical notions: first, that God created the world in seven days (Genesis 1) and, second, that in the eyes of God one day is like a thousand years (cf. Ps. 90:4 and 2 Peter 3:8; see Volz, *Die Eschatologie der jüdischen Gemeinde*, 135ff). The belief was shared by Jews and Christians alike, and the fear of the impending apocalypse exploded into a real epidemic during the second part of the fifteenth century, fueled no doubt by the fall of Constantinople.

25. Mazower, *Salonica*, 66.

26. Pierre Belon (Belon du Mans), quoted in Fernand Braudel, *Mediterranean World*, 809.

27. See Trachtenberg, *Jewish Magic*, 1.

28. See fols. 195r–196v. Even though the text does not include the number 72 in its heading, there is no doubt that it is a copy of our amulet text. Iatsimirskii, who included it in his study of the *The 72 Names of the Lord*, treated it without qualification as a copy of the same text; so did Krasnosel’tsev in his description of the codex. The fact that the text is followed here by the same names “for fear of dying” that follow it in the *Berlin Codex* (where the numerical designation in the heading is intact) also suggests that the two copies—the earliest ones we possess—stem from the same tradition. Given the evident unreliability of the scribes, who, it seems, often worked in a hurry and without understanding

or paying much attention to their sources, it is quite plausible to assume that the number was indeed present in the antigraph and was omitted by mistake.

29. The highly unusual reference to the desert, apparently in the literal sense of the word, could be an index to a possible Palestinian origin, or to an intended use of the text related to pilgrims or travelers to Palestine; the concern with dangers on the road also points to itinerants, who at the time would be pilgrims, missionaries, or traveling merchants.

30. See Fernandez, “The Dark at the Bottom of the Stairs,” in his *Persuasion and Performance*, 214–38, where he suggestively defines the inchoate as the underlying and overlying sense of wholeness that we can never really grasp. Unlike the Freudian category of the unconscious, Fernandez’s inchoate is a category at the interface of the psychophysiological and the sociocultural, and it is the sociocultural aspect—its dependence on predication and performance—that is most representative. That is how we are to take, I assume, Fernandez’s claim that the inchoate for him is “above all a set of images” (215).

31. Rabbinic *mezuzot* were designed as a permanent reminder of Jewish monotheism and a pledge of personal commitment to Yahweh, as the initial verses of the corresponding Torah passage indicate: “The Lord is our God, the Lord alone. You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your might” (Deut. 6:4–5). The scriptural passage continues with instructions “to keep these words in your heart,” “recite them to your children,” and “write them on the doorpost of your house and on your gates,” the latter demand corresponding directly to *mezuzah* pragmatics. The rabbinic practice was also oriented toward commemoration of the Jewish exodus from Egypt, at the eve of which the Lord instructed the Israelites to mark their doorposts with blood from the sacrificial lamb, so that he would pass over their houses and spare them when striking every Egyptian firstborn (Exod. 12:13). In the spirit of that event, and particularly in the context of religious and ethnic plurality that characterized the life of medieval European Jews, a *mezuzah* was meant to be a very public index of Jewishness. For details about the *mezuzah* tradition and its absorption into Jewish magic practices, see Trachtenberg, *Jewish Magic*, 146ff.

32. *Ibid.*, 147.

33. The text is largely unstudied. Santos Otero, in his *Die handschriftliche Überlieferung der altslavischen Apocryphen*, limits his section on this text to a general description with no examples (241); Thomson, in his critical review of Santos Otero’s book, gives only two bibliographic references (“Apocrypha Slavica: II,” 98). I am familiar with several different Slavonic texts that are designated in their headings as “Angelic names.” The specific type to which the text in *Jerusalem 22* (fols. 194v–195r) belongs is known to me from fourteen copies, most of which appear in the context of other sacronymic lists and, more often than not, specifically of *The 72 Names of the Lord*. Almazov offers Greek parallels to the same text in his *Vracheval’nye molitvy* (315–16, #17–18).

34. Morton Smith, in “A Note on Some Jewish Assimilationists,” sums up very nicely their successful assimilation in Christian context: “[There was] a minority group of Jewish immigrants who entered Europe from the Near East about the beginning of the present era, prospered mightily, after their (probably involuntary) conversion to Christianity, became an important part of the ruling class, and in many cases assimilated with, in others reportedly drove out, the earlier inhabitants of their own sort (this in spite of the fact that they also remained active in Jewish affairs). I refer to the angels” (207).

35. The most useful guide to Jewish angelology is the famous treatise *Sepher ha-Razim*, edited in an English translation by Michael Morgan. Trachtenberg's *Jewish Magic* offers a good introduction to the vast field; Davidson's *Dictionary of Angels* is a useful tool; Schwab's *Vocabulaire de l'Angéologie* should be taken with a grain of salt when it comes to his etymologies.

36. The list in transliteration (which preserves all its idiosyncrasies) reads: "Michail, Gavril, Uril, Raphail, Rugail, Pandaforannoil, Kaluil, Saresam, Melhisedol, Nefuil, Afarail, Sihail, Sinail, Ephig[?]pha[?]." The first four names, Michael, Gabriel, Uriel, and Raphael, which incidentally form the stable core of this list across its various copies and redactions, are all standard archangels' names. They are among the names of the Seven Archangels in almost all traditions. The other fairly common name on the list is Rugail, known from 1 Enoch (the Ethiopian version; see Knibb, *Ethiopic Book of Enoch*) and rendered variably as Raguél, Ruhiel, Ruagel, and Ruahel. This name also appears often in Slavonic amulets. All five, I should add, are among the names of the seven angels who, according to the Kabbalah, rule the earth (see Budge, *Amulets and Superstitions*, 375). The rest of the names are fairly cryptic, with the possible exception of the name Melhisedol, which recalls the biblical Melchizedek (Gen. 14:18–20; Ps. 110:4; Heb. 5:6 and 10, 6:20, and 7:1–17), who also appears in the Slavonic version of 2 Enoch. Because of the privileged place of this biblical king in the Gnostic tradition (and its later ramifications in dualistic heresies), the appearance of his name in the list could be an index to a Gnostic connection.

37. Their collective name itself reveals their mission: the Hebrew *mal'ak* means "envoy" or, by extension, "agent." The Greek term *angelos*, which has become standard in Christian use, is not quite an equivalent translation, meaning literally "messenger."

38. Trachtenberg, *Jewish Magic*, 77. "The name has swallowed up the Angel," aphoristically continues Trachtenberg, moving toward a summation of his argument. By the Middle Ages, an angel had become a dual category in Jewish popular religious life: "The one comprised the true angels as tradition painted them, the other, a vast multitude of mystical names, designated as angels and in theory accepted as such—an angelic host in suspension, so to speak, capable of being precipitated into its individual angelic components—but actually significant only for the mystical powers inherent in the name itself" (89).

39. Schäfer, *Hidden and Manifest God*, 106; cf. Lesses, "Speaking with Angels," 47.

40. See Trachtenberg, *Jewish Magic*, 148 and 150–51; see also the Kabbalistic *mezuzot* in Aptowitz, "Les noms de Dieu."

41. See Miklas and Zagrebin, *Berlinski sbornik*, fol. 71v. I have come across another copy of the same list written on the back cover of a *Troparion* from the end of the fourteenth century, MS 343 of the Hilandar Monastery, a microform in the Hilandar Resource Center for Medieval Studies; see the description in Matejic and Thomas, *Catalog*, HM. SMS 343, where the list has the same proviso as in the *Berlin Codex* and reads: "Anekot-nosh, Atanatosh, Shiu[. . .]ksha." The Greek origin of the second name is obvious (all three forms are a corruption of *athanatos*), and the first one suggests a Greek origin, clearly filtered through Latin in the case of the *Berlin Codex*.

42. This corpus comprises fols. 381r–383r.

43. *Ibid.*, fols. 381v–382r.

44. For *The Ten Names of God* in the Christian tradition, see chapter 4 in this volume. The text in the *Berlin Codex* reads as follows: “The names are ten, as is given by the Jews, and by them the Lord is called: First name and second *elee*, third *eloi*, fourth *savaoth*, fifth *filoi*, sixth *asafai*, seventh *adonai*, eighth *gai*, ninth *tromini*, tenth *evanei*. In the beginning was the word. The Lord sent his angel in the days of Herod the King, in the names of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.”

45. Trachtenberg claims that it “assumed godlike proportions in the charms”; see *Jewish Magic*, 101.

46. Gaster, *Sword of Moses*; Naveh and Shaked, *Amulets and Magic Bowls*, 16, n. 11.

47. Trachtenberg, *Jewish Magic*, 202; cf. Schäfer, *Hidden and Manifest God*, 94–95, for similar techniques.

48. Between fols. 381r and 383r, there are five more such recipes.

49. Kabbalistic amulets often encode messages in a specific “angelic” script dubbed “eye writing,” since its constitutive elements are lines and small circles resembling eyes (see Scholem, “Kabbalah,” 635). For more specific detail about these Kabbalistic figures (with samples), see Trachtenberg, *Jewish Magic*, 141–42 and 150–51.

50. Note that the corresponding Torah verses to which the passage alludes (Ex. 23:20–21) make no mention of the name of God.

51. The English translation is borrowed from the verbatim quotation of the passage in Barrett, *Magus*, II.1.12:59. Cf. the original Latin text in the reprint edition of Compagni, *Cornelius Agrippa*, 473, v. 7–11: “Tunc singulae tres literae sibi subalternatae constituunt unum nomen, que sunt septuaginta duo nomina quæ Hebraei Schemhamphoras vocant; quibus, si in fine addatur nomen divinum El vel Iah producent septuaginta duo angelorum nomina trisyllaba, quorum quilibet fert magnum nomen Dei sicut scriptum est: ‘Angelus meus praecedet te; observes eum: est enim nomen meum in illo.’ Et hi sunt qui praesident septuaginta duobus quinariis coelestibus totidemque nationibus et linguis et humani corporis artibus cooperanturque septuaginta duobus synagogae senioribus totidemque Christi discipulis.” It is curious that, according to the appendix in Compagni’s edition, chapter 25 of book 3 in which the passage occurs is a new addition to the Juvenile Draft of the treatise from 1509–10, one of the few chapters completely absent from the old version, which suggests that Agrippa based it on new or newly evaluated sources.

52. *Sefer Raziel*, 40b; quoted in Trachtenberg, *Jewish Magic*, 95–97.

53. Trachtenberg, *Jewish Magic*, 289, n. 22. Gaster discusses the early mystical thesis that the most sacred name of God consists of 72 parts (letters) in *Sword of Moses*, 8 (cf. Cohon, “Name of God,” 596, and Scholem, “Name of God,” 69).

54. Scholem, “Name of God,” 69. For the creative power of the Name, see Scholem, *On the Kabbalah*, 41–44. The most eloquent source for the identification between the Name of God and the Torah is a passage by the thirteenth-century Spanish Kabbalist Gikatila, a passage strangely reminiscent of the prologue to the Fourth Gospel (John 1:1–4), which, however, features Word (the Greek *logos*) instead of Name (the Hebrew *shem*): “His Torah is in Him, [and] the Holy One, blessed be He, is in His Name, and His name is in Him, and . . . His Name is His Torah” (MS Jerusalem, 8/597, fol. 21v, cited in Scholem, *On the Kabbalah*, 43).

55. “The entire Torah consists of the names of God, and the words we read can be divided in a very different way, so as to form [esoteric] names,” wrote Nahmanides (Moses

ben-Nahman of Gerona, ca. 1194–1270), the highest legal and religious authority of his time for the Jews in Spain and the person to whom the Catalonian Kabbalah owed much of its popularity (see Scholem, *On the Kabbalah*, 38).

56. *Bahir's* place and time of origin are the focus of ardent debates among scholars. The Kabbalist legend attributes the book to Rabbi Nehuiah ben HaKana, a first-century Talmudic sage, and claims that it was transmitted orally within closed circles through the twelfth century. Some scholars accept that manuscripts may have existed, but claim that access to them was even more restricted. The first printed edition of the book appeared in Amsterdam in 1651. A bilingual Hebrew-English edition is available in Kaplan, ed., *Bahir*.

57. Kaplan, *Bahir*, pt. 110, 42. The complete reconstruction of the name is available in a number of sources in English; see, for example, the critical bilingual edition of Johannes Reuchlin's famous treatise *On the Art of the Kabbalah* (1517) in Reuchlin, *Art of the Kabbalah*, 263.

58. The key passage in *Bahir* opens with the statement, "There is a name that is derived from the three verses (Exodus 14:19-21)," and concludes, "These are the 72 names" (Kaplan, *Bahir*, pt. 110, 42, emphasis added). In a similar vein, another passage claims, "the Blessed Holy One has 72 names" (*ibid.*, pt. 94, 34).

59. In the following century, the Spanish kabbalist Abraham Abulafia (1240–c. 1291) addressed this issue by proposing a complex system for vocalizing *Bahir's* reconstruction of the name and reciting it as an instrument for mystical meditation; see Idel, *Mystical Experience*, 22–41.

60. Alternative reconstructions are registered in other Kabbalistic texts, none less peculiar in form. As many as twelve are reported by Petrus Galatinus in the section on the Kabbalah in his *Opus de arcanis catolicae veritatis* published in 1518 (lib. 2, cap. 17, pp. 97–98).

61. The term *quinary* belongs to the astrological idiom and refers to five degrees of the celestial sphere, which measure one 72nd part of it. The astrological imagination divides the heavenly sphere into 12 houses that harbor the 12 signs of the Zodiac and are said to correspond to the 12 principal rays of the sun. Each solar ray further splinters into three, and then into six smaller rays. The sun is thus surrounded by three radiant garlands, and the 72 rays of the outermost ( $12 \times 6 = 72$ ) are the quinarys. In Agrippa's passage, evidently, the 72 quinarys refer to an imaginative 72-fold structure of the astral sphere, with each of the angels—the body of celestial creatures in charge—ruling over one of the 72 parts.

62. Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic*, 273.

63. Compagni, *Cornelius Agrippa*, 41.

64. The notions of cosmic correspondences and universal harmony were borrowed by Agrippa from the Venetian humanist Zorzi (Francesco Giorgio Veneto); see especially Zorzi, *De Harmonia Mundi*. On the influence of Zorzi upon Agrippa at the last stage of his work on *De occulta philosophia*, see Compagni, *Cornelius Agrippa*, 35ff.

65. Kaplan, *Bahir*, pt. 1, 94, 34.

66. Kaplan, *Meditation and Kabbalah*, 141 and 168, n. 85.

67. Kircher, *Œdipus Ægyptiacus*, 281.

68. The diagram further explicates the connection between the 72 sunflower petals and the 72 leaves in the Tree of Life ("The Magic Tree") that grows in the center of Paradise, of which every leaf stands simultaneously for one of the names of God and one of the

nations, the nations continually saluting the names in eternity. The entire diagram is usually linked to a passage in the principal book of the Spanish Kabbalah, the *Zohar* (The book of enlightenment), saying that the “the crown of all legions rises in 72 lights,” (see Schimmel, *Mystery*, 265). Another thirteenth-century Kabbalist text, written by Moses de Leon of Guadalajara, to whom Gershom Scholem attributes the greater part of the *Zohar*, links the figure of “72 roots” to the cosmic tree (see details in Idel, *Kabbalah*, 124). Scholem expounds more generally the homology between “the body” of the Torah and the Tree of Life based on the same source (*On the Kabbalah*, 46). Note also that in the late Jewish apocalyptic tradition, the number of the 72 nations is said to correspond to the 72 shining pearls in the heavenly Jerusalem that provide light for the nations (see Baumgarten, “Duodecimal Courts,” 76, n. 66).

69. The texts are all part of the Nag Hammadi corpus discovered in 1945 in Upper Egypt; see Robinson and Smith, *Nag Hammadi Library*. The issue is discussed at some length, albeit from different points of view, in Schoedel, “Scripture and the Seventy-Two Heavens,” and Idel, *Kabbalah*, 122–28. I rely on their competent summaries for my own cursory review of the Gnostic sources.

70. Quoted in Idel, *Kabbalah*, 123.

71. The Septuagint rendering of *b'nai elim/elim* (“sons of gods/gods”) in the Bible is “angels.” Deuteronomy 32:8, in both the Septuagint and the Qumran versions, postulates a guardian angel for each nation, whereas the Massoretic text reads “according to the number of the sons of Israel,” to avoid a seeming allusion to henotheism. I am grateful to Fr. Lawrence Frizzell for this clarification. On guardian angels for nations, see also Dan. 19.

72. Quoted in Schoedel, “Scripture and the Seventy-Two Heavens,” 121.

73. Moshe Idel contends that, even though the earliest extant sources are indeed Gnostic, they all show familiarity with Jewish texts. This allows him to conjecture that the cosmological views shared by Gnostic and Kabbalistic texts were Jewish in origin and that, while they infiltrated Gnostic circles, they were also passed down by the Jewish oral tradition until the emergence of the medieval Kabbalah (see Idel, *Kabbalah*, 116).

#### CHAPTER NINE

1. Idel, *Kabbalah*, 254.

2. A bilingual Latin-English edition of Pico's *Conclusions*, with extensive commentaries, is available in Farmer, *Syncretism in the West*.

3. “Nulla est scientia quae nos magis certificet de diuinitate Christi quam magia et cabala,” *ibid.*, 496–97.

4. See Lejay, “Giovanni Pico della Mirandola.”

5. See Scholem, “Kabbalah,” 643–44.

6. Froehlich, “Pseudo Dionysius and the Reformation,” 36.

7. Yates, *Art of Memory*, 188–89.

8. See Yates, “Ramon Lull and John Scotus Erigena.”

9. See Hames, *Art of Conversion*, and Yates, *Art of Memory*, 177. On the influence of the Sufi mystic Mohidin on Lull, see Palacios, *Mystical Philosophy*.

10. Yates, *Art of Memory*, 188.

11. Mirandola, *Opera omnia*, 180, cited in Yates, *Art of Memory*, 189.

12. For the alchemical treatises attributed to Lull under the rubric of the Christian Kabbalah, see Taylor, *Alchemists*, 110ff.

13. Note that Christian authors' admiration for the Kabbalah aroused angry responses in some Jewish quarters, particularly among the critics of the Kabbalah who opposed its diffusion in Christian circles and its potential use as a missionary tool (see Ruderman, *Renaissance Jew*, 52–56).

14. For the latter, see Idel, *Kabbalah*, 4.

15. The two books are published together in a modern reprint; see Reuchlin, *De verbo marifico*. For an English translation of *De arte cabbalistica*, see Reuchlin, *On the Art of the Kabbalah*. Another scholar of the Kabbalah who deserves honorary mention is the Frenchman Guillaume Postel (1510–81). He translated the *Zohar* into Latin even before it had been printed in Hebrew, and complemented it with his new theosophic commentaries.

16. For a review of Agrippa's contribution to the study of Kabbalah, see Müller-Jahncke, "Agrippa von Nettesheim et la Kabbale."

17. See Foucault, *Order of Things*, 32.

18. *The Grimoire of Honorius* is fallaciously attributed to Pope Honorius III (1216–27). Arthur Edward Waite's seminal study, originally published in London in 1898 as *The Book of Black Magic and of Pacts*, offers a detailed presentation of this remarkable monument (see Waite, *Book of Ceremonial Magic*, 96–194). As Waite himself notes, the book is exceedingly rare in the original and is better known in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century reprints. I am familiar with the text through a modern French edition of 1978.

19. See Butler, *Ritual Magic*, 157–58. Western magic manuals list 72 chief devils or demons and 72 seals that control them, "the number seventy-two [being] obviously inspired by the seventy-two divine names of the Shemhamphoras," as Butler observes (66).

20. Kabbalistic texts and practices use reconstructions of the name of 72 combinations as well as lists of 72 or 70 divine names. For the latter, see Dan, "Seventy Names of Metatron"; cf. Buchman-Naga, *Schlüssel zu der 72 Gottesnamen*. While none of these names are "attributes" of the divinity, the rabbinic tradition offers an alternative list of 70 divine names, which, much like the names promoted by Dionysius the Areopagite, are all meaningful terms identified through scriptural exegeses and supported by biblical proof-texts. Moreover, they are placed in the center of a corpus of several 70-fold lists, where all other classes (the 70 names of Israel, the 70 names of Jerusalem, the 70 names of the Torah) echo the number of the Lord's names as a gesture of deference; see *Midrash Zuta* on the *Song of Songs*. I have used the German translation available in Brasch, *Midrasch Schir Ha-Schirim*, 20–35. The parallels between this corpus and the Christian material that I discuss in this book are too striking to miss, although I still have found no evidence that proves—or even suggests—a direct influence.

21. Evidence of the amulet use of *shem ha-mephorash* in Kabbalistic context is provided by Theodore Schrire, who claims that, since the name was too large to be written on one amulet, it was divided into two groups that were to be worn on the two arms or by couples (*Hebrew Magic Amulets*, 99). Schrire also provides a photographic reproduction of one Hebrew amulet that features the entire name on a single plate (see plate 27 and its description on 154–55). The topos itself is apparently a common element in magical texts; see, for instance, a Hebrew healing amulet from the Cairo Genizah, which opens with an invocation of the Explicit Name and the 70 names of God (Schiffman and Swartz, *Hebrew*



and *Aramaic Incantation Texts*, 113; 115); compare a reference to the 70 names in another amulet from the same collection (*ibid.*, 151).

22. Languedoc, the center of the Provençal Kabbalah at the time, was under the religious dominance of the Cathars, a dualist sect related to the Bulgarian Bogomils, whose own genealogy leads back to both Gnosticism and Manichaeism. Given the mutual affinities between Kabbalah and Catharism, their coexistence in Provence has prompted scholars to suspect direct transactions between them, and especially a Cathar influence upon the Kabbalists. No conclusive evidence, however, has been found to corroborate such conjectures. For a balanced view on the subject, see Stoyanov, *The Other God*, 192–93, esp. 282.

23. A masterpiece of thirteenth-century vernacular literature, the poem (approximately 8,100 verses) is preserved in a single thirteenth-century copy with missing beginning and ending. The most recent critical edition of the original text with an introduction, commentaries, and a glossary is Ulrich Gschwind, ed. *Le Roman de Flamenca*. For a bilingual Provençal-English edition, see Hubert and Poter, *Romance of Flamenca*.

24. Verses 2279–88 (cf. Hubert and Poter, *Romance of Flamenca*, 142). I am grateful to my colleague Michael Agnew for his help with this translation. A less literal translation is provided by H. F. M. Prescott: “He [William] also said. . . a short prayer that a holy hermit had taught him. This prayer was made up of the seventy-two Names of God as they are spoken in Hebrew and Latin and Greek. It renews and strengthens a man in the love of God, and makes him daily more worthy. Everyone who repeats it, and believes it, is rewarded of God, and no one who trusts in it heartily, or who carries a written copy of it about with him, comes to a violent death” (Prescott, *Flamenca*, 44–45).

25. Miklas and Zagrebin, *Berlinski sbornik*, fol. 71v.

26. For the edited text, see Meyer, “La prière des soixante-douze noms de Dieu”; it is reprinted in Bolte, “Über die 72 Namen” (446). I am grateful to my colleague Susan Boynton for consulting me on the translation of this passage. Note that the Provençal proviso differs from the familiar Slavonic model only in its inclusion of a clause on difficult delivery, a concern that does not seem to be characteristic of the Slavonic tradition of this text. See also Nelli, “La Prière,” which unfortunately was unavailable to me while preparing this manuscript.

27. “And they entreated him by each of the seven universal things—sun and moon, dew and sea, heaven and earth, day and night” (see Tymoczko, *Irish Ulysses*, 148–49).

28. There is an inconsistent tendency in this copy to numerate the names, which is abandoned after the third name. In the Provençal text only the first name is numbered.

29. The original Slavonic term is *opoka*, glossed by Miklosich as *saxum*, that is, “rock” (see his *Lexicon*). “Rock” (Gr. *petra*) is part of the standard repertory of divine names; see, for example, the extensive Byzantine seventh-century list quoted in chapter 4. Moshe Taube, in personal communication, has suggested to me that the Slavonic noun could be etymologically related to the verb *opochati*, “rest” or “dwell.” The name read as “rest” may point to Matt. 11:28, “Come to me, all that are weary and are carrying heavy burdens, and I will give you rest” (cf. Heb. 4:1). More broadly, such a reading may reflect the Hebrew term *Shekhina*, literally “indwelling,” namely, of God in the world. I should mention that the Kabbalists, in a radical departure from Rabbinical theology, treat

*Shekhina* as a quasi-independent feminine element within God (see Scholem, “Kabbalah,” 104–5).

30. *Athantos* (Gr., “Immortal”) and *Pantokrator* (Gr., “Omnipotent”) are doubled by their Slavonic equivalents (*bes'mr'tnyi, vsedr'zhitel'*), just as the Slavonic term for “the Lord” (*gospod'*) is listed side by side with the transliterations of both the Hebrew *Adonai* and the Greek *Kyrios*. The only transliterated names that are not coupled by their translation are *Sabbaoth* (Hebr., “Of the Hosts”) and *Paraklit* (Gr., “Intercessor”), both fairly common titles that are often used without translation in the liturgical idiom.

31. For Malinowsky's “coefficient of weirdness” and “coefficient of intelligibility,” by which we may distinguish between religious (magical) and profane language, see Tambiah, “Magical Power of Words,” 185ff.

32. One interesting exception is the name *Utis*, which, if it is not a complete distortion of another name, is an accurate Latin transliteration of the Greek *outis*, “Nobody,” which is the name that Odysseus gave himself to fool the Cyclops Polyphemos (Homer, *Odyssey* 9:366–67). It is also notable that the Slavonic version renders the descriptive name “Tetragrammaton” (which replaces the tabooed YHWH) with the name revealed to Moses at the burning bush (Exodus 3:15): “I am who I am” (*az' esm' ezhe es'm'*). This awkward name later causes a lot of problems for the scribes who wrestle with it, to rather peculiar effect; see, for example, the double negative “I am not who I am not” (*az' ne sam izhe ne sam*; see Raikov, ed., *Abagar na Filip Stanislavov*, n.p.), or the deliciously elliptic “I am the one who” (*az' es'm' ezhe*; National Library SS Cyril and Methodius, Sofia, Bulgaria, Manuscript and Rare Book Collection, MS. Slav. 646 [44] from 1787, fol. 8v).

33. The Slavonic text, however, seems to have more taste for foreign terms: it includes a number of transliterations that, in the Latin list, are either translated or absent altogether.

34. Iatsimirskii, “K istorii,” 9; Miklas and Zagrebin, *Berlinski sbornik*, 39.

35. The names are numbers 51 and 52 by my count.

36. “The original, no doubt, was Greek” (see Iatsimirskii, “K istorii,” 10).

37. Miklas and Zagrebin, *Berlinski sbornik*, 39.

38. See Stoyanov, *The Other God*, 225.

39. The practice of wearing *The 72 Names of the Lord* as an amulet is documented also among the Romanians. Hasdeu quotes an eighteenth-century Romanian *Rojdanicul* (Zodiac), which instructs that a sickly girl, born under the sign of Scorpio, should “carry on herself the 72 names of Jesus Christ, so that no unclean spirit can come close to her,” and provides a parallel Serbian version (Hasdeu, *Cărțile poporane*, 23); cf. Gaster, *Literatura populară română*, 401–2, and Cartoian, *Cărțile populare*, 135, who report earlier copies of the same text.

40. Apart from the short article by Johannes Bolte published at the beginning of the twentieth century, we have only separate publications by Nyrop, “Navnets magt” (see esp. 185–92), and Gaster, “Zur Quellenkunde Deutscher Sagen und Märchen.” See also a seventeenth-century German text preserved in the form of an amulet roll in Hamp, “Sigilla Solomonis.”

41. Bolte mentions a French version dated from 1454 and a German one from the fifteenth century; see “Über die 72 Namen,” 447–49.

42. The Dominican friar Agostino Giustiniani (1470–1536), a well-known Christian Kabbalist, is credited with the authorship of a book entitled *Praecatio pietatis plena ad Deum omnipotentem composita ex duobus et septuaginta nominibus divinis, hebraicis, et latinis* (Prayer full of piety to the Almighty God, composed of 72 divine names in Latin and Hebrew). The book's first edition (Paris) has no date of publication, but the second edition came out in Venice in 1513; see details in Salone, "La fortuna editoriale," 137, and 142, n. 10; cf. Cevolotto, *Agostino Giustiniani*, 37–38). It is tempting to assume that this text may have informed the first printed edition of the Slavonic 72 *Names of the Lord* (1520), which was also published in Venice, but more information is needed before drawing such conclusions. Regrettably, I found the reference to Giustiniani's edition too late to be able to consult it and compare his prayer to the Provençal and the Slavonic lists.

43. About the book, see Waite, *Book of Ceremonial Magic*, 39–57. This study still remains the most thorough and illuminating presentation of the *Enchiridion* in its context.

44. Waite, *Book of Ceremonial Magic*, 40.

45. Waite, who appears to be somewhat skeptical about the authenticity of the 1523 edition, reports that it was mentioned as authentic by Pierre Christian in his *Historie de la Magie* (*Book of Ceremonial Magic*, 41). It is also mentioned by Nisard in his *Historie des Livres Populaires* (149), though he quotes the date of publication as 1525. Since I could find no traces of this edition in contemporary archives and libraries, I am not prepared at this point to make any statements about its authenticity.

46. The article, first published in the journal *Germania*, 1881, is reprinted in Gaster, "Zur Quellenkunde Deutscher Sagen und Märchen" (1071–85).

47. Bolte, "Über die 72 Namen," 447–48.

#### CHAPTER TEN

1. Vuković, ed. *Zbornik za putnike*. Stojan Novaković's, "Božidara Vukovića zbornici za putnike," is still the best study of this book and the tradition that stemmed from it. In another article, "Apokrifi iz štampanih zbornika Božidara Vukovića," Novaković edited the group of texts that I will be discussing here, including the amulet itself.

2. Slavic books using Latin script (mostly Bibles and liturgical books in Latin) began to appear almost simultaneously in Cracow and Pilsen in the early 1470s, only a decade and a half after the landmark publication of the Gutenberg Bible in 1456. The first Glagolitic book (a Missal that is claimed today by both Croats and Slovenes as their own) was published in 1483. For the history of Slavic typography, see Pantić, ed., *Pet vekova srpskog štamparstva 1494–1994* (cf. the papers from the 1991 conference in Cracow dedicated to the study of the oldest Slavonic printed books, edited by Rusek, Witkowski, and Naumow, *Rękopis a druk*).

3. See Schmitz's *Südslavischer Buchdruck in Venedig*, which offers invaluable information about all Slavic Venetian editions with corresponding bibliographic data on their extant copies. Cf. Pesenti, "Stampatori e litterati," esp. 105, for Cyrillic printing and the role of Božidar Vuković.

4. For the activities of Vuković in Venice, see Milović, ed., *Štamparska i književna djelatnost*.

5. Work on the book was completed on March 6, 1520. The only two books that the publishing house had issued before the *Miscellany* were a Psalter and a Typikon, both published in 1519 (see Vujošević, “O nekim biografskim podacima,” 43).

6. One of the extant sources of the texts in the Vuković redaction, *Prayer Book of Niketa*, from 1787, held at the National Library SS Cyril and Methodius, Sofia, Bulgaria, Manuscript and Rare Book Collection, MS 646 (44), fols. 3v–6v, also features a different version of *The 72 Names of the Lord* that is closer to the versions in both the *Berlin Codex* and *Jerusalem 22* (fols. 8v–9r). The fact that the two versions appear together in a single codex is itself evidence that they were thought of as distinct textual items, complementary rather than equivalent to one another.

7. The Greek original is published in Migne, *PG*, 52:395–414. The standard Slavonic translation is Makarii, *Velikii minei-chetii*, *Noiabr’ 13–15*, 1132–61.

8. I have quoted this passage for another purpose in chapter 4.

9. The Greek original is published in Migne, *PG*, 97:861–81. For the Slavonic translation, see Makarii, *Velikii minei-chetii: Sentiabr’ 1–13*, 386–96.

10. It is hard to estimate exactly how much Vuković was involved in the making of the book, but the evidence suggests that he was mostly the man with the vision and the money. Apparently he knew little about bookmaking and possibly even less about the making of texts.

11. The classic study of the shift from manuscript to print culture and its aftermath is Eisenstein, *Printing Revolution. Durability and accessibility* are both her terms.

12. It appears that the career of the two Latin lists was similarly boosted by their first printed publication in the *Enchiridion* of Pope Leo III, which allegedly dates from 1523 (though the earliest editions of the book that we possess are from the seventeenth century). Only a comprehensive study of these amulets in their Western context, however, can substantiate such a superficial impression.

13. As a rule, the manuscript copies that follow Vuković’s version omit the exegetical part. The only exception known to me is the sixteenth-century copy published in Tikhonravov, *Pamiatniki*, 2: 339–44. Note that this copy documents the dissemination of Vuković’s version in Russia; see Ryan, *Bathhouse at Midnight*, 294–95.

14. The amulet is part of the collection of the State Library of Ljubljana, Slovenia. For a comprehensive study of the amulet, with a reproduction of the plates, see Radojčić, “Srpski Abagar.” Apart from *The 72 Names of the Lord* and *The 72 Names of the Theotokos*, the amulet includes *The Names of the Angels*, *The Names of the 17 Prophets*, and *The Names of the 40 Martyrs*, together with an array of troparia, kontakia, and prayers addressed to numerous saints. See an edition of the corpus in Izmirlijeva, *Christian Art of Listing*, 213–15.

15. To the best of my knowledge, there is no other extant Slavonic source of this text. My attempts to find possible rhetorical sources of the nominal series in the Slavonic hagiographic and hymnographic repertoire have proven fruitless. A Greek list of twenty-two names for the saint, edited in Pitra, *Spicilegium solesmense complectens sanctorum patrum*, 3:448, offers a clue to the possible source of this tradition, though the epithets listed there do not coincide with the Slavonic “names.” The other sacronymic lists in the corpus encompass *The Names of the 17 Angels*, *The Names of the 70 Disciples*, and *The Names of the 40 Martyrs*. See an edition of the corpus in Izmirlijeva, *Christian Art of Listing*, 215–18.

16. The only major editorial change introduced in the later tradition of the texts was the truncation of their exegetical parts, evidently considered redundant (they survived in only two of the total thirty-two available copies).

17. The text and its status as a written amulet have been studied by Iatsimirskii in conjunction with *The 72 Names of the Lord* and *The 72 Names of the Theotokos* (see Iatsimirskii, “K istorii,” 22–50). In some cases, the list of epithets is replaced by a bona fide canonical text, the *Troparion for the Cross*.

18. The sign of the cross is still routinely made by Eastern Orthodox Christians whenever they fear a threat of any kind. The monks on Mt. Athos reportedly used to make it for protection against evil forces even over their open mouths each time they yawned, since demons were believed to be able to sneak in unnoticed through any open aperture of the body.

19. Geerard's *Clavis Apocryphorum Novi Testamenti* is an excellent bibliographical source for the Abgar tradition across the Christian world (65–89). For the most complete monograph on the cycle in the field of Slavic medieval studies, see Meshcherskaia, *Legenda ob Avgare*. On the Slavonic tradition, see Minchev and Skovronek, “Tsikulut za Tsar Avgar.”

20. Eusebius, *History of the Church*, 1:13.

21. Minchev and Skovronek have proposed, on the basis of late seventeenth-century texts, that the epistles were also used liturgically in folk milieu, in a paraliturgical ritual for curing a sick person, where the reading of the Abgar Cycle over the head of the patient replaced the reading from the Gospels (see their article “Tsikl”t za Tsar Avgar,” 337–39). This use, while not amuletic, is certainly no less apotropaic in nature; in fact placing the sacred text of the Gospels over the head of a sick person (always with the written text facing downward!) is, as the authors point out, one of the most telling examples of an apotropaic use of the Word in official Eastern Orthodox practice.

22. [Č]. T[ruhelka], “Jedan zanimliv zapis”

23. See Raikov, *Abagar na Filip Stanislavov*, 26. Raikov notes that a similar use of the name with the meaning of “amulet” occurs also among Romanians (37, n. 62).

24. See Gorskii and Novostruev, *Opisanie slavianskix rukopisei*, 600–601.

25. A sixteenth-century manuscript copy of the *Letter's* Slavonic version, published by Tikhonravov, claims explicitly that “everything is possible for those who have with themselves the names of Christ.” The claim is followed by a familiar proviso about keeping the names clean and a short list of divine names that is apparently a contracted version of *The 72 Names of the Lord* (*Pamiatniki* 2:16). This evidence suggests that the two talismanic texts are closely associated with one another, possibly to the point of being fused together.

26. Note also that the letter-amulet was delivered in the legend by “one of the 72 disciples.” Therefore, in the context of a 72-fold universe (where to every evil God counterpoises one of his omnipotent names), the epistle itself can be construed as a metonymic symbol of the protective shield that God had extended over the 72 nations through the Apostolic Church.

27. The *Enchiridion* of Pope Leo III (at least in the 1740 edition that was available to me) includes all the texts from this corpus, showing particularly strong intertextual links between the two lists and the texts from the Abgar Cycle that follow them. This

clustering is further enhanced by a prayer to Jesus Christ that appears at the end of the Abgar Cycle and concludes with an invocation of “the 72 names of God,” followed by another long series of divine appellations. The similarity between the amulet texts in the *Enchiridion* and in Vuković’s *Miscellany* may prompt us to suggest that Vuković’s *Miscellany* was based on earlier Latin models. We cannot seriously entertain such a conjecture, however, until the sources and the history of the *Enchiridion* are sufficiently studied.

28. The “printing revolution” first received a full-scale treatment in Eisenstein’s monumental, two-volume work *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change*; see also her abridged and illustrated version of the same study, *The Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe*.

29. Ong, *Orality and Literacy*, 122–23 (emphasis added). Cf. Eisenstein’s similar observation that the printing revolution involved a shift “away from fidelity to scribal conventions and toward serving the convenience of the reader” (*Printing Revolution*, 22).

30. Novaković, “Božidara Vukovića zbornici za putnike,” 138.

31. Eisenstein, *Printing Revolution*, 48.

32. Cf. similar observations in Vujošević, “O nekim biografskim podacima,” 44.

33. Incidentally, Keith Thomas links the decline of protective magical devices to the growth of insurance in seventeenth-century England (see *Religion and the Decline of Magic*, 651).

34. For the most detailed information about the printing activities of Božidar and Vincenczo Vuković, see the contribution by Pašikan in Pantić, *Pet vekova srpskog štamparstva*, 76–92.

35. For details about this book, see Atanasov, “Iakoviiat chasoslovets.”

36. The missing pages belong to the copy of the 1547 edition of Vuković’s *Miscellany* held at the Museum of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Belgrade, pr. bk. no. 96, which I have seen on microfilm at the Serbian National Library, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, Manuscript and Rare Book Collection (microfilm # 3737–82), and to one of the two copies of Yakov Kraikov’s *Book of Hours* held at the Public Library in Plovdiv, Bulgaria, Manuscript and Rare Book Collection, Slavonic Division, RTs 19.

37. For an offset edition of this rare book with an excellent study of its history, see Raikov, *Abagar na Filip Stanislavov*.

38. Raikov, *Abagar na Filip Stanislavov* (the edition of the text has no pagination).

39. While in the *Miscellany* the *Eulogy of the Holy Cross* is followed by a complete Abgar corpus and the two talismanic lists, here the lists (minus their exegetical parts) appear directly after the *Eulogy*, and the corpus concludes with a *Letter of King Abgar* (without any mention of the Edessa image).

40. See Jerkova, “Latinski izvori na Stanislavoviia ‘Abagar’”; cf. Jerkov and Capaldo, “Razlicnie potrebie di Jakov di Sofia.”

41. The surprising inclusion of teachers among the religious specialists indicates that the publication of the book also had an educational purpose. In support of that assumption, seventeenth-century documents attest to the use of the *Abagar* in Bulgarian Catholic communities as a primer from which young Catholics learned the ABCs of Catholicism (together with useful information about Calvinists and Lutherans, in tune to the agenda of the Counter-Reformation). It is also significant that the book was written mostly in the

vernacular and was thus more intelligible to its audience, which must have facilitated its educational function (see Raikov, *Abagar na Filip Stanislavov*, 29).

42. It is important to note that this book was not produced for the market as was Vuković's reader, but for distribution free of charge by a network of missionaries exclusively for propaganda purposes. (The Congregation had specifically banned several years earlier any commercial deals involving its own editions.)

43. About the heresy in the context of Christian dualism, see Stoyanov, *The Other God*, esp. 127–30 and 258. For details about the Bulgarian Paulicians, see Miletich, "Nashite pavlikiani"; and Iovkov, *Pavlikiani i pavlikianski selishta*. For the Catholic missions among the Bulgarian Paulicians, see the documents published in Primov, Sariiski, and Iovkov, *Dokumenti za katolicheskata deinost*.

44. Raikov offers some direct evidence that written amulets were especially popular among the Bulgarian Paulicians, who used to refer to them as *abgari* (see Raikov, *Abagar na Filip Stanislavov*, 37, n. 62).

#### EPILOGUE

1. Barney argues that a principle represents a list the way a title represents a book, which means it can *stand for* the list itself ("Chaucer's Lists," 191).

2. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*. Significantly, this study has a profound concern with order: its ultimate thrust is toward a third way between anarchy and tyranny, a way to which the Dionysius who emerges from my reading is no stranger.

3. Weil, *Gravity and Grace*.

4. Among the other postmodern takes on the subject, Lacan's is perhaps the most recognizable. For his treatment of need and desire, see, for example, Vincent Crapanzano, *Hermes' Dilemma and Hamlet's Desire*, 89. Lacan, however, plays out the two categories mostly in the field of psychological motivation. The ethical reprisal by Levinas is much closer to my own approach, and more illuminating of my own problematic.

5. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 33–34.

6. *Ibid.*, 254.

7. *Ibid.*, 116.

8. *Ibid.*, 191.

9. To be sure, the prospect of a perfect apocalyptic moment brought about by human desire is most desirable for religious "infiniteizers." One recent example is the apocalyptic "erotic utopia" of Vladimir Solovev (1853–1900), one of Russia's most influential modern religious thinkers, and the radical attempts to put it into practice in Russian symbolist circles (see Matich, *Erotic Utopia*).

10. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 117.

11. Bourdieu, *Logic of Practice*, 14–15.

12. Stanley Cavell offers a similar argument in his exploration of the pursuit of happiness in early Hollywood comedies of remarriage. His entire argument implies a certain vision of order that emerges from these films. The lesson of the cinematic genre that interests him, as he notes in the introduction, is that "the achievement of human happiness requires not the perennial and fuller satisfaction of our needs as they stand, but the examination and transformation of those needs." Cavell goes on to directly qualify desire-driven

life as removed from need: “Even if we whole-heartedly agreed with such a thought (as voiced, say, in Plato and in Rousseau and in Thoreau and in Freud), no one would say that it is applicable in all human contexts. It applies only in contexts in which there is satisfaction enough, in which something like luxury and leisure, something beyond the bare necessities, is an issue. This is why our films must on the whole take settings of unmistakable wealth; the people in them have the leisure to talk about human happiness” (*Pursuit of Happiness*, 4–5). In this case, the “distance from need” is provided directly by luxury, though wealth and indulgence are far from constituting the exclusive source of the “leisure to desire.” In the Christian ascetic tradition, it is achieved by *akēdia* (Gr., “apathy”), the cultivated indifference to needs, which is to say, by a way directly opposite to that of material luxury.

13. The classic text is Malinowski, *Magic, Science and Religion*. Scholars as distant from one another as Thomas, Tambiah, and Kieckhefer all adopt this dichotomy while working diligently to clarify—from their respective methodological points of view—its highly problematic nature; see Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic*; Tambiah, *Magic, Science, Religion*; and Kieckhefer, *Magic in the Middle Ages*.

14. A good survey of the polemics surrounding the term *popular religion* is O’Neil, “From ‘Popular’ to ‘Local’ Religion.” Dinzelsbacher provides a relatively recent bibliography of studies in popular religion (see “Zur Erforschung der Geschichte der Volksreligion”). In Slavic ethnological studies, the equivalent terms are numerous, “everyday” and “folk” religion being the more popular alternatives (see the review article by Mikhailova, “Za s’ d’rzhanieto na termina *bitovo/folklorno khristianstvo*).

15. The Russian term *dvoeverie*, “dual faith,” established in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, is based on the assumption that the peculiar form of Christianity embraced by the Russian common folk is Christian in name only, being in reality a blend of pagan beliefs and practices under a thin Christian veneer (see, for example, Zhivov, “Dvoeverie”). The Western term “syncretic” is less radical: it implies only contamination, not an ideological duality.

16. The distinction between the “easy” and “difficult” ways in religion belongs to Eliade (see *Shamanism*, 401; and *Images and Symbols*, 54–55; cf. Staal, *Exploring Mysticism*, 100–101 and 155–56).

17. I have been using, without explicitly defining it, the term *heteropraxis* as a way of avoiding this discussion before all the cards are on the table. The term is more neutral only if we think of it in opposition not to *orthopraxis* but to what we may call *homopraxis*—the emphasis being not on what is right or wrong, but on homogeneity of belief as opposed to the salient omnivorousness of certain Christian practices that, eclectic and redundant as they are, have no distinct doctrinal (or theoretical) counterparts. The term is useful for descriptive purposes, but it has rather limited theoretical potential, for it perpetuates the understanding of Christian alternatives as forms of corruption and contamination.

18. David Tracy offers a similar position when he presents a defense of “the ordinary ways” along with the “extraordinary expressions” of religion. “[T]he religions are carried along at least as much by the vast undertow of ordinary people leading ordinary religious lives as by the classic prophets, mystics, and saints,” he argues passionately, and concludes with the assertion that “no exponent of religious intensifications can ignore the classics of ordinary religious life” (*Plurality and Ambiguity*, 96–97).



19. One example of a powerful theoretical hypothesis based on the assumption of a single and unequivocal “medieval order” is Umberto Eco’s opposition between the Western European medieval (Catholic) Cosmos, driven by the homogenous “logic of the inventory,” and the modern (nihilist) “Chaosmos,” exemplified by the heterogeneous lists of James Joyce (see Eco, *Aesthetics of Chaosmos*, esp. 6–11).

20. See Cunningham, *Meaning of Saints*, 16; cf. Peter Brown’s influential study *Cult of Saints*, esp. the chapter entitled “Potentia” (106–27).

21. The story, considered one of Sir Arthur’s masterpieces, has numerous editions—see, for example, the eponymous selection *Nine Billion Names of God* (3–11). In this edition, put together by Clarke himself, he quotes the British biochemist and geneticist John Burdon Sanderson Haldane (1892–1964), who remarked of this story and the story “Star,” “You are the only person to say anything original about religion in the last two thousand years” (3). He goes on to undercut his own solemnity: “In fact, you have said several mutually incompatible things. If you had stuck to one hypothesis you might have been a serious public danger.”

22. Clarke, *Nine Billion Names*, 11.

